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I.
DID COUNSEL FOR THE RESPONDENT OFFER
DEROGATORY AND UNTRUE STATEMENTS TO THE TRIAL
COURT AND THEREFORE MISLEAD THE TRIAL COURTS
AND PREJUDICE THE TRIAL COURTS BASED ON THESE
UNTRUES
H.
DID THE TRIAL COURTS ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN
ITS REMOVAL OF PETITIONERS JOINT CUSTODY OF A
MINOR CHILD, WITHOUT DUE PROCESS OF LAW AND DID
THIS TERMINATION INFLUENCE LATER CUSTODY
PROCEEDINGS
m.
DID THE TRIAL COURT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN
BIFICATING PETITIONERS DIVORCE AND WITHOUT DUE
PROCESS OF LAW?
1
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IV. DID COUNSEL_EQR THE PETITIONER ERR IKLHIS
REPRESENTATION OF THE RIGHTS OF THE PETITIONER AND
JUSTICE
V.
IS THE TRIAL COURT'S ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN ITS
REFUSAL TO HEAR EVIDENCE TO PROVIDE AN PETITIONER
WITH AN ANNULMENT OF THE MARRIAGE AND ABUSE THE
RIGHTS OF THE PETITIONER
VI. DID COUNSEL MISREPRESENT PETITIONER IN HIS
UNTIMELINESS IN FORWARDING ON THE SUPPLEMENTAL
DECREE OF DIVORCE CAUSING PETITIONER TO LOOSE
CERTAIN RIGHTS UNDER THE LAW
VH. THE TRIAL COURT'S REFUSAL TO SET ASIDE
THE JUDGMENT ENTERED AGAINST THE PETITIONER WAS
CONTRARY TO THE CONCEPTS OF JUSTICE AND EQUITY
AND AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHERE THE PROCESS OF
JUSTICE HAD GONE AWRY BECAUSE OF INCOMPETENCE
BECAUSE OF INCOMPETENCE OF COUNSEL THAT
MANIFEST IN JUSTICE WILL RESULT OTHERWISE?
Vffl. DID THE TRIAL ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN NOT
GRANTING PETITIONER ATTORNEYS FEES?
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APPELANT COURT JURISDICTION
This Court h a s jurisdiction P u r s u a n t to Utah Code. Ann.78-2a-3.

issirps PRESENTFD rmmmm fr STANPARP txFBsmm
I.

DID COUNSEL FOR THE APPELLEE OFFER DEROGATORY

AND UNTRUE STATEMENTS TO THE TRIAL COURT AND THEREFORE
MISLEAD THE TRIAL COURTS AND PREJUDICE THE TRIAL COURTS
BASED ON THESE UNTRUES?
Standard of Review:

In Rule 4.1 {a}, Ut. Rules of Judicial Review,

It clearly states that t h e makings of a false statement of a material fact.
Chapter 13,Rule 3.3 a (1) Ut. Rules of Judicial Review, statesr A lawyer
shall not knowingly m a k e a false statement of material fact o r law^to a
tribunal and Rule 3.3 a ( 4 h U t . Rules of Judicial Review states that
offering of evidence that lawyer knows t o b e false or if thethe4awyer
offered evidence and comes to know of its falsity, the lawyer shall take
reasonable steps remedial measures.

H.

DID THE TRIAL COURT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN ITS

REMOVAL OF THE PETITIONERS JOINT CUSTODY OF A MINOR
CHILD, WITHOUT DUB PROCESS OF LAW AND DID THIS
TERMINATION INFLUENCE LATER CUSTODY PROCEEDINGS?
Standard of Review: "A mere findmg^that the parties a r e or are
not "fit a n d proper persons to b e awarded t h e care, custody and control"
4
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L

of the child cannot p a s s muster w h e n t h e custody award is challenged

P
and a n abuse of the trial court's discretion is urged on appeal".
(Martinez v. Martinez. 728 P.2d 994 (Utah 1986) at page994.)
Rule 5 (1) of URCP provides t h a t papers shall be served upon all
parties and that without service d u e process was not proper process.

m.

DID THE TRIAL COURT"ABUSE ITS DISCRBTIOfMN

BIFICATING PETITIONERS DIVORCE AND WITHOUT DUE PROCESS
OF LAW?
Standard of Review According t e 7 ^ Am J u r 2d S t a t u t e 133,
states that a bifurcation of a-divereein mafrimonial cases is not
suggested: and cites Ffnkelv, F i n k d .12fVM4se 2d 936,466-N¥S2dr906.
)

Rule 5 {1) of URGP provides^ t h a t p a p e r s shall be servedh upoft all
parties a n d tbat without service d u e process-was not proper-preeess.

IV.

Dro€X>UNSEfcFORrTHE^PETntONERERRE^HIS

REPRESENTATION OF THE RIGHTS OF THE PETITIONER AND
JUSTICE.
Standard of review:

In United States v. Tucker. 716 F.2d 576

(9th Cir. 1983-)- paragraph 50, ineffective assistance of counsel: Mid
counsel aet i n a reasonably competent and: effective manner and, tf not,
was his incompetence prejudicial to fee defense". "A lawyer shall
provide competent representation to a client, chapter 1&, Rule-1.1
U.R.J.A. . Competent representa&on-requircs the
f
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legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness, and preparation reasonably
necessary for the representation.

"A lawyer shall abide by a ^ h e n t ' s

decisions concerning t h e objectives of representation" C h . l S , Rule-1.2
(a)U.R.J.A.

V.

DH> TRIAL COURT ABUSE ireDISCRETIONWITS

REFUSAL THE HEAR EVIDENCE TO PROVIDE AN ANNULMENT OF
THE MARRIAGE AN ABUSE OT THE^RIGHT* OF THE PETITIONER.
Standard of Review:

Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 102 states,

"promotion of growth a n d development ef t h e law of evidenced© t h e e n d
that t h e t r u t h may b e aseertainedVand proceedings justly determined".
The federal ruies of evidence Article IVV Ruie~462, statesr^AH~releyant
evidence is admissible".

VI.

DID TRIAL COUNSEL MISREPRESENT PETITIONER E* HIS

UNTIMELINESS IN FORWARDING ON THE SUPPLEMENTAL DECREE
OF DIVORCE CAUSING PETITIONER TO LOOSE CERTAET RIGHTS
UNDER THE LAW.
Standard of Reviewr Utah Code of Judicial Administiatiuii Rule
1.4 (a), states a lawyer shafr4ceep^ a elient reasonable informed about
die status of a matter a n d prompdy comply with reasonable requests-for
information.
VH. THE TRIAL COURT^REFUSAL TOH5BT ASTOB-THE
JUDGMENT ENTERED AGAINST THE PETITIONER WAS CONTRARY
6Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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TO THE CONCEPTS OP JUSTICE AND EQUITY AND AN ABUSE OF
DISCRETION WHERE THE PROCESS OF JUSTICE HAD GONE AWRY
BECAUSE OF INCOMPETENCE OF COUNSEL THAT MANIFEST
INJUSTICE WILL RESULT OTHERWISE?
Standard of Review:

Incompetenee-or ineffective of counsel

claims present a mixed question of faet a n d law^ Therefore, in a
situation where a trial c o u r t h a s previously heard a motion^ based- on
ineffective assistance of counsel, reviewing courts are free to m a k e an
independent determinationrof t h e trial court's conclusions. The factual
findings of the trial c o u r t , however, shall n o t b e set aside u n l e s s clearly
erroneous. State v. Temphn 80^F.2nd^ 182.186 (Utah 199Hr State v.
Crestani. 771 P.2nd 1085,K>891UtahApp. 1989)r State v. Goodman.
763 P. 2nd 786, 787 (Utah >988)r State-v. Walker. 743 P.2nd 191, 193
{Utah 1987).
In Order to b r i n g s successful incompetence of counsel elaim.
Appellant m u s t show t h a t prior eounsel's performance was deficient in
t h a t it fett below a n objective standard of reasonableness^ a n d t h a t the
deficient performance prejudiced the-outeome.
Further, t h e appellant court m u s t indulge in4he-strong
presumption that counseFs^onduct falls within the wide range of
reasonable professional assistance; t h a t -is-, the Appellant m u s t
overcome the presumption t h a t under t h e circumstances, the
challenged action might be eonsideredr sound strategy.
In Order to demonstrate that trial counsel's deficient performance
7
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prejudiced the appellant, it m u s t be shpwnrthat there is a reasonable
probability that, b u t for c o u n s e l s unprofessional errors, t h e r e s u l t of
the proceedings would h a v e been different. A reasonable probability is a
probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. State v.
Templin. supra. 186; S t a t e v . Garrett; 207 U.R.A. 45,46 ftJtahrApp.
1993).

/

Vffl. DID THE TRIAL COURT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN NOT
GRANTING PETITIONER ATTORNEYS FEES?
Standard of Review:
/

Statement of the Rule: 4 - W 1 , 2 (akteh U.R. J.A. The eourt may
l^ant the motion if t h e court finds that: (a>. t h e moving party lack* the
financial resources to p a y for costs a n d feest (c>. the costs a n d fees are
necessary for the proper prosecution of

of the action.

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS^ STATUTES & RULES
REQUIRING INTERPRETATION
R u l e 5 (a)

Utah Rules of Givll Procedure

Pg:-

17

Rule 5 ei>

Utah Rules of Givil Procedure

pg,

&,35;36v42

Rule 3 7

Utah Rules of Givil Procedure

m

48

Rule 1.4 faf

Utah Rules of Judicial Admins^

6
4,34,40,41

Rule 3.3 (a>{4> UtahrRules^of Judicial Admins,
Rule3.ata>{l>

Utah Rule^of Judicial Admins.

R u l e 4 . Itah

Utah Rules of Judieial-Admins.

pg:

Ch. 13, Rule 1.1 Utah Rutes-of Judieialr Admins.
8
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4,34-,40
4,37,40,45
5

prejudiced the appellant, it m u s t be shown that there is a reasonable
probability that, b u t for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of
the proceedings would have been different. A reasonable probability is a
probability sufficient t o undermine confidence in the outcome. State v.
Templin. supra, 186; State v. Garrett. 207 U.R.A.45,46 (Utah App.
1993).
Vm. DH> THE TRIAL COURT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN NOT
GRANTING PETITIONER ATTORNEYS FEES?
Standard of Review:
Statement of t h e Rule: 4-011, 2 |a>,{e>. U.R. J.A. The <x>urt may
grant the motion if the court finds that: (a), the moving party lacks the
financial resources to pay for costs and fees; (c). the costs and fees are
necessary for the proper prosecution of defense of the action.

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES & RULES
REQUIRING INTERPRETATION
Rule 5 (a)(1)

Utah Rules of Civil Procedure

Pg.

17

Rule 5 (a)(1)

Utah Rules of Civil Procedure

Pg-

5,35,36,42

Rule 37 (f)

Utah Rules of Civil Procedure

Pg-

48

Rule 1.1

U.C.J.A. Chapter 13

Pg-

5

Rule 1.2(a)

U.C.J.A. Chapter 13

Pg-

6

Rule 1.4 (a)

U.C.J.A. Chapter 13

Pg.

6

Rule 3.3 (a)(1)

U.C.J.A. Chapter 13

Pg

4,34,40

Rule 3.3 (a) (4)

U.C.J.A. Chapter 13

Pg-

4,34,40,41
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Rule 4.1(a)

U.C.J.A. Chapter 13

Pg-

4,37,40,45

Rule 4-911,2 (a), (c)

U.C.J.A. Chapter 13

Pg-

40,47

Rule 102

Utah Rules of Evidence

Pg

6,36,44

Rule 502 4, B, ill

Utah Rules of Evidence

Pg

37

Article I Rule 102

Federal Rules of Evidence

Pg

6,44

Statute 133

75AMJUR2d

Pg

5,42

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
1).

Nature of the case

This case involves a custody

dispute between parties who were in a relationship since 1993. The
Appellee was at the time a foreign exchange student from Russia and
the Republic of Georgia. Over the insueing months the relationship
developed marriage was brought up. The Appellant brought up the age
difference between the parties and was told by the Appellee that in her
country she would be getting married right now. That the Appellee's
grandfather was twice the age of her grandmother and that Appellee's
mother was ten years older than her father.
In December of 1993 Appellant went to Russia to meet Appellee's
family and ask about marriage. A few days prior to leaving for Russia
the Appellant meet in passing, Roy Jesperson who at that time was the
Appellee's sponsor as an exchange student. Mr. Jesperson asked the
Appellant "how do you know she is not marring you to get into the
country." Upon arriving in Russia the Appellant asked the Appellee
about what Mr. Jesperson had said and the Appellee laughed and said
9
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/

Pg-

6

Utah Rules of Judicial Admins.

Pg-

40,47

Rule 102

Utah Rules of Evidence

Pg 6,3&,44

Rule 502 4, B, 111

Utah Rules of Evidence

Statute 133

75AMJUR2d

Article VT Rule 102

Federal Rulea of Evidence

Ch. 13, Rule 1.2 (a)

Utah Rules of Judicial Admins.

Rule 4-911,2 (a), (c)

/

/
/
/

Pg

37

Pg

&,42

Vt

6,44

/

/

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
1).

Nature of t h e case

This ease involves^ st custody
/

dispute between parties whchwerein-a relationship since 1903. The
Appellee was at the time at foreign^ exchange student from Russia^ and
the Republic of Georgia. Over th^insucingmonths the relationship
*

developed^ marriage was brought up; The Appellant brought up-the age
difference between the parties^ andr was told by^ the Appellee that in-her
country she would be getting married right now. That the Appellee's
grandfather was twice the age of her grandmother and that Appellee's
mother was ten years older than-her father.
In December of/1993^ Appellant went to Russia to meet Appellee's
family and ask about marriage. A fewdays prior to leaving for Russia
the Appellant meet in passing, Roy Jespersenwho at that time was^the
Appellee's sponsor a s a n exchange student. Mr. Jespersen asked^the
AppeUant"how do you^know^she ianet marring you to get int&the
country." Upon arrivingir* Russia the Appellant asked the Appellee
about what Mr. Jesperson hadr said and the Appellee laughed^ an& said

•

0

/

I
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it was a joke between them.
TheAppeHant andrAppcllcc exchanged wedding rings in Russia
a n d in March of 1994 returned together to the United States. Oft June
9th, 1994 Appellant and Appellee were married in Salt Lake City Utah.
In October 1994 the Appellant had life threatening surgery and
required the couple to move to California which they did after ihe birth
of their daughter in January 1995. In December of 1994 the Appellee's
mother Tanja came to stay theeouple for three months and-also made
the move to California. Appellant required a seeond surgery which-was
had at the end of January 1995.
The couple lived in California near the ApjreUant^m©ther-#om
Jan. 1995 to Sept. 1995. In J u n e of 1995^ Appellee no l o n ^ r nursing
fee child, wanted to 6& something and got a Job4n California.
Att monies whicbrthe Appellee made was her money to^use and
spends how she liked. The Appellant was responsible for-aHfamily
expenses.
hi Sept. of 1995 the couple rcturncdrto Salt Lake City a n d stayed
wtthr a mutuaL Mend until they found an apartment, h r Oct. 1995 the
family movedrinto a small apartoaent irrSalt Lake City. The family
consisted of Appellant and Appellee their daughter and t h e Appellee's
mother. In late Nov. 199&tbeAppcHant4eft to go to California for work
and rcturncd^ust before Christmas 1995.
The day before the Appellant's return foSalt Lake Cttyrthe
Appellee's^ mother movedrout^ stating r "she was having a nervous
10Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

breakdown earing for our hh month old child aHrthe timer" Tamriko-was
away most of the timey with friends and left the-ehild frvthc care of her
mother. Upon the Appellants returnrthe^Appellee's schedule did not
change and the Appellant fremr that day forward was the primary^eare
grver fer-eur child.
The relationship^betweeHrthe Appellant and the Appellee was not
good. The Appellant found a journaTbelonging to the Appellee and^ead
it for t h e purpose of understanding why his relationships with-the
Appellee was so bad. The Journal revealed that the Appellee was having
extra marital affairs with men she was acquainting herself-with, and
dated baek to^April of ±994.
The Appellant confronted the Appellee on this discovery of journal
entries and the Appellee charged^ the Appellant and rjegar^hitting^ and
pulling Appellant's hair. The Appellant h a d to-jump oufthe second floor
window of the apartment te- escape fee attack. The Appellee thanrwent
to stay with her mother.
Shortly thereafter, Appellant asked-the Appellee to work things
out, Appellee wanted some time alone. The Appellant and there child
went t& stay with family in California. Appellant and the^hild^toved
out of the apartment and the Appellee moved back in. The last time the
Appellant and the chfld resided with the Appellee was middle February
199€-and to that point Appellant was-responsible for ati-expenses.
While in California the Appellant read^ a Journal ofthe Appellee's
which stated;
11
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The Appellee writes "I ain't in love with Walter. As always in
my life, right now I have to make a lot of choices- and again
and again and again Of course probably, the most clever
thing for me to do would be to goback to the USA with
Walter . For there this- way, I c a n get education I want to get,
work, hobbies andnsoon. AH this will be much easier to^et
being next te-Walter, for 1 know hewill help^me as much-as he
ean." (ree.236-256)
In J u n e of 199fr the Appellant confronted the Appellee on the
discovery while in California. Shortly thereafter, the Appellee
telephoned the Appellant and saidr"if you^do^ot help mewith^ny
immigration I will fight you for custody of our daughter."
tor July 1996 the Appellant returned to Salt Lake City with their
daughter. After additional physical and verbal attacks by the Appellee,
toward the Appellant, a Protective Order was filed against the Appellee.
Custody of their daughter wa&^ven4o the Appellant a& well as child
support order to be determined at tetek this^was^a^-eedto-by-the
Appellee and granted by the Third District Court,Ut., case* 960906856
SA, filed Nov; 5th 1996^attachmcnt # 1 ).
Appellee writes "I am with Baf^iy; all day... t want to just runr away
toN.¥r(ree 236-256).
Over the next 9 months the Appellee made no attempts^to^ see their
child. When the Appellant a n d the child were out and happened-tensee
the Appellee, the Appellant would stop s o that the child couldsee4ier
12
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mother. There were a number of times when the Appellant would take
the child to the AppeHee^s pkteeof work so that the chlldrcould see her
mother.
September through November of 1997 theAppelleecalledto-see
her daughter st couple of times a month and^eita couple ^ f those
occasions Appellant assisted^Appellee with transportation.
Gnroneof the visits our daughter came home and asked Appellant
why mommy says that daddy 4s a bad guy. After hearing^this Appellant
told Appellee that she should not: be sayings this to our daughter.
Shortly thereafter our child came home after at visit withr the Appellee's
mother, the Appellee was alse there, and the child asked the Appellant
why does nana say that daddy is a bad gay. Again the Appellant
telephoned the Appellee this time warned Appellee not to do it again.
In late November of f997 after a visit with the Appellee theehild
came home saying that the Appellee had told her not to eat daddy's pepe. The child at this time is ordy 34 months old. The AppeHanthas
been the only stable figure in thechUds life te-this point. IN THE
GHILDS^BEST INTEREST AFTER-THES£ THREE INCroENTS-THE
APPELLANT TOLD THE APPELLEE SHE COULD NOT SEE OUR CHILD
ALONE.
At this point, Appellant telephoned^ his attorney Robert Macri told
him of the situation and to have supervised visitation arranged. This
was done by the Appellant on December 02, 1996 after whfeh-time
Appellant and the child left te-Cahforniarlbr the Christmas holiday.^Mr.

ia
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Macrl never followed through with his use of the affidavit and
supervised visitation was never requested.
Appellant reeeivedra called in California by Mr. Macri and was
informed-that-Appellant needed tfr return^ as soon as possible.
Prior t&this, it was agreedrt^by the Appellant aneVthe Appellee
that the ehUeVwould be withrthe Appellant for the December Ghrishnas
and witrr t h e Appellee in-January for the Orthodox Christmas.
When Appellant returnedr from Christmas^ vacation with the-ehild
Appellant wa& told that I had t o ^ ^ e the minor ehild overtfr t h e Appellee
which Appellant couleVnetrdOv Appellant wanted first to-ge-before the
Judge.
On January 9th, 1997 Appellant wrote an-Affidavi^for the eeurts
prior t€h the seheduledrJanuary K£, 1997 hearing date. The Appellant's
affidavitr of January 9th-1997 nor-the Letter to the c o u r t s ^ December
02, 1996^appear on the-reeord? Yet were provided by theAppellant to
Appellants^ attorney Robert Macri.
The Affidavit of the Appellee dated December 22, t996^s a
document which Appellant was-never-made aware of, and the first time
Appellant saw this document wa^in September of 2002. This-doeument
(Affidavit of Appellee 12-22-9&, ree. 29^a7>i& so^full of untruths and
depicts Appellant as arbaoVguy.
That Appellant understand* better why the trial court and later
the custody evaluator has^aetedrfhe way-they have toward Appellant.
And justifies^ the slant-which the custody evaluator bases his-later
14
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decisions and conclusions and on.
2)

Course of Proceedings and Disposition in Lower ^}ourt

On October 23, 1996^etiti©ner SlesHfor annulment ©fdivoree
(ree. 1 -3}. Appellant is granted^ustody of title minor child.
December 22,190? Appelleefiles-affidavit (rec. 29-37)-,- and obtains
temporary restraining.
J a » 12,1998 hearing before Judge rwasikf, Appellant and Appellee
ordered joint custody of child. January 12, 199& hearingAppellee's
attorney Suzanne MareMus^ spoke before Judge Iwasiki and made4ier
remarks and two points come to mind which were completely and totally
untrue;
1} the Appellee was not allowed to speak to her daughter en-her
birthday. This is not true.!
2} That the Appellant w a s in possession of Appellee's personal
belongtogs and refusedr to give them to Appellee. This was^ not true!
Appellant had tried for months^ prfoF to this asking the Appellee tocome
and piek-up^ these belongings, and reimburse-Appellant the-$450
shipping expense from Ganforniai The Appellant was told by^his
attorney Mr. Macri to retain-the journals for the future proceedings.
The Appellant sees now how his^tetions^ in- court before Honorable Judge
Iwasakt January 12, 1997^were dfsrespecaau-of the courtsv^nd
apofo^zes for emotional this outburst. It was spirited by-emotion and a
reaction^ to-the-untrues-verbalized to the courts Ms. Marelius.
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Macri never followed through with his use of the affidavit and
supervised visitation was never requested.
Appellant received a called in California by Mr. Macri and was
informed that Appellant needed to return as soon as possible.
Prior to this, it was agreed: to by the Appellant and the Appellee
that the child would be with the Appellant for the December Christmas
and with the Appellee irt January for the Orthodox Christmas.
When Appellant returned from Christmas vacation with-the child
Appellant was told that I had to give the minor child over to t h e Appellee
which Appellant could not do% Appellant wanted first to go before the
Judge.
On January 9th, 1997 Appellant wrote an Affidavit for the courts
prior to t h e scheduled January t2, 1997 hearing date. The Appellant's
affidavit of January 9th^ 1907 nor t h e Letter to^the courts of December
02, 1996 appear on t h e record? Yet were provided by t h e Appellant to
Appellants attorney Robert Macri.
The Affidavit of the AppelteedatedrDeeember 22, 19964s a
document which Appellant was never made aware of, and the first time
Appellant saw this document was in September of 2002. This document
(Affidavit of Appellee 12-22-96, rec. 29-37>is so full of untruths and
depicts Appellant as a bad guy.
That Appellant understands better why the trial court andr later
the custody evaluator has acted-the way they have toward Appellant.
And justifies the slant whiehr the custody evaluator basea his4ater
14
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decisions and conclusions and on.
>

2)

Course of Proceedings and Disposition in Lower Oourt

On October 23, 199€rPetitioner fUes for annulment of drvorce
(rec. 1 -3). Appellant is granted custody of the minor child.
December 22,1997 AppeHeeffles affidavit {rec. 29-37), and obtains
temporary restraining.
J a n 12,1998 hearing before Judge Iwasikt, Appellant and Appellee
ordered joint eustody of child. January 12, 1998 hearing Appellee's
attorney Suzanne Maretius spoke before Judge Iwasiki and made her
remarks and two points come t&mind which were completely an&^otally
untrue;
1) the Appellee was not allowed to speak to her daughter e n her
t

birthday. ^Fhis is not b?ue.!
2) That the Appellant was in possession vf Appellee's personal
belonf^ngs and refused to ^ e them tfr Appellee. This was net true!
Appellant had tried for months-prior t o this asking the Appellee toeome
and piek-up these belongings, ^ndTeiinburse Appellant ^fae-ftl 50
stappingjexpense fromCahfornia. The Appellant was told-by his
attorney Mr. Maori to retain the journals fer^hefuture proceedings.
The Appellant sees nowhow^his actions in court before Honorable Judge
Iwasaki January 12, 1997 were disrespectful of the courts, ftnd
apologies for emotional this outburst. It was spirited by emotion and a
leacLioii to the untrues veibalized to the cuuits Ms. Mare^ius.

ft

,*.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Appellants attorney Mr. Macri knew these statements were untrue and
yet said nothing. Mr. Maori never informed the Appellant «f the affidavit
of the Bee. 22, 1997. Mr. Maerf informed theAppellant mat t h e judge
placed him to contempt and: told Appellant he could be put in jail. ^Fhis
seared the Appellant and nothing more was questioned by-the
Appellant, until this appeal.
The Appellant has never t a or in front of the child any madeany
disparaging remarks about the ehilds mother. The child: has asked
"why" about the problems between her mom and dad. Appellant said
"mommy did not tell daddy the truth, and that it is only between
mommy and daddy". This is the only possible remark which could be
construed as disparaging, but it is the truth and the only way Appellant
could answer his ehilds question.
This custody arrangement ended on October 26th 2Q€KMn a
hearing before Commissioner Bradford.
It should be noted that the Appellant's Attorney Mr. Robert Macri
died in March of 2000, he was Appellants only attorney.
MOTION OCTOBER 26, 2000
Hearing October 26, 2000, Appellant before commissioner
Bradford asked the court was not knowing why he was there tha^day,
(transcript on motion 10-26-00, pg 1, lines 8-22, attachment # 2 ).
Ms. Marelius "I know Mr. Horton's problem is he probably hasn't
received a copy of my motion because the mailing address he gave^the
court and me is apparently not a good address and I got one pleading
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back at least." (see attachment # 2, pg 1, line 25, pg 2, linesi*6).
There was no bad address! The Appellant recited into thereeordrhis
address, and court records wiHr reflect that this is the same address
already in the court record. The same address that Appellant had
received the letter from the court notifying him of the hearing Appellant
was at this day. There was no had address!
Ms. Marelius made false statements disparaging the Appellant.
Appellant recognizes 17-1$ false statements made by the Ms. Marehus,
about the Appellant (attachment* 2 , Pg 4, lines 15-25 & Pg. 5, lines 125 & Pg. 6, lines 1-10 & Pg. 7 lines 15-49).
What transpired on this day was Appellee being granting ^f^sole
custody and a bifurcation of the fault divorce. Both objeetedrfo a^the
time of hearing by Appellant. Appellant brought up to the courts 4hat
the Appellant was seeking to have the marriage annulled {h-anserip^ on
motion, attachment #2 ,10-26-00, pg. 12, lines 5-6).
Appellant did not have the benefit of counsel, and was looking.
The Appellant did not have the benefit of a copy of the motion and
was thereby was blind sided by the Appellee's Attorney, in violation of
Rule5(a}U.R.C.P..
Let it also be noted that these motion or pleadings are not found in
the courts record.
Over the ensuing months the child spent so much time with-the
Appellee's mother that the childs teacher asked the Appellant who in
your family speaks another language. This continued and continues to
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this day that the child is a good deal of the time in surrogate eare. That
the Appellant has never, never been called and asked to eare of his
child.
For the next 18 months a lot of activity took place in this-ease.
Appellant was unaware of most of it. Mr. Macrf did not inibrm4he
Appellant of the proceedings. Between April thru August 4099,
Appellant was in California and was unaware of-court filings.
Appellant and Appellee h a d themselves modified the visitation
schedule and the child was in California half of the time with Appellant.
Appellee knew of course that Appellant was in California and yet filings
continued as Appellee's attorney Ms. Marelius tried to file motions^nd
orders. Why did Appellee not inform Ms. Marelius of Appellants current
status.
DIVORCE STIPULATION/ SETTLEMENT JUNE 29, 2001
The Appellant engaged the services of attorney Martin Tanner by
the time of pretrial which Mr. Tanner attended and also represented the
Appellant at trial June 29th, 2001, before the Honorable Judge Iwasiki.
Mr. Tanner telephoned the Appellant on or about June 12th 2001
and said he had just gotten the evaluation that he had read-the
evaluation and said that the Appellee and the Appellant were even
except that Appellant was unable to have a home visit with^the
evahiator and that the Appellee therefore appeared more stable. The
Appellant told Mr. Tanner he wanted t a go to^ trial on custody. The
Appellant asked about the custody evaluates and Mr. Tanner saidrhe
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would have the evaluator at the trial.
June 28th, 2001 Mr. Tanner telephoned Appellant and said he
received a fax from Ms. Marelius a finding and fact and conclusions of
law and a decree of divorce. Appellant told Mr. Tanner he waygoing to
trial. That Appellant had the evidence for trial. Where Appellant lived
,Where child friends were in the neighborhood. Mr. Tanner said ok, and
that they should meet the next morning at 8:30 am, June 29th, 2001.
Mr. Tanner did not show up to his office until 8:55 am and said
they would go over it on the walking to the court house. Upon arriving
at the court house that Appellants custody evaluator was not present,
Mr. Tanner responded he could not be there.
Appellant was taken aback.
Mr. Tanner lead Appellant into a conference room andrwas
followed by Appellant's brother a member of the LDS churehrwith a
temple recommend and the Appellant's mother.
Mr. Tanner went over with the Appellant the, findings andfact
and conclusion of law. Appellant, Appellant's brother, Appellant's
Mother and Mr. Tanner for the next hour worked out stipulations to^aot
have a trial.
Mr. Tanner told the Appellant the importance of the Custody
Evaluation and that the judge decides 99% of the time with the
Evaluators decision.
Mr Tanner told Appellant he would lose in a trial!
That Appellant would owe $5000 to $6000 in attorneys fees for
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Appellee. This fact untrue, the finding and fact, state; eaeh party pays
own attorneys fees.
The following stipulations were worked out
1)

Mr. Tanner would guarantee that Appellant wouM^et

"FIRST RIGHT GF REFUSAL". Thatrif childs mulhei euuld not
be with her thea the child could come home. Appellant
proposed sceneries, example: "when the child i& home and
her mother has to work past the ehilds bedtime woutdohild
be able to stay home?" and Mr. Tanner responded that-fhe
Appellee would pick u p the child after school the next day.
2}

Appellant was told that he would have the child 1/3-ef-the
year under the proposed visitation schedule.

3)

That the child support arrears would be computed against
child support owed to Appellant by Appellee.

4)

That marital debt was to be dropped

5)

The Appellant was concerned aboutrfuture child support *hat
some months Appellant made little money a n d others more
money. That $800 would be a baseband fluctuate with
Appellants income. Mr. Tanner lead Appellant to believe
that child support was for taking care of health4nsurance
and care of the child.

Appellant strongly objected to marital debts and that while ^he
Appellant and the Appellee were living under the same roof Appellant
paid all expenses. The birthing of the child was paid for by Baby^your
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Baby. Appellant therefore challenges the marital debt. Mr Tanner ^old
Appellant this section would be dropped.
6}

The Appellant was told by Mr. Tanner that the Judge would
not hear evidence and grant an annulment because "he
would not make a bastard out of the child". Appellant had a
problem with irreconcilable difference and believed tt would
be adultly for the Appellee had already admitted t e that {see
attachment #3).

The Appellant, Mr. Tanner D. Troy Horton and Katharine Horton
were in the conference room for about arr hour several times Mn Tanner
got up to discuss Ms. Marelius stipulations adjustments a number of
times.
In the court room before Judge Iwasiki Mr. Tanner addressed-the
court and refers to the findings and fact and decree of divorce that 4hey
"wiH constitute the settlement agreement with the parties with a couple
additions" ree. 362 Pg. 1 lines 21-22).
Mr. Tanner begins with "disparaging remarks" (ree. 362, Pg. 1 tine
24).
Note:

This stipulation already covered in (ree. 274-284
Facts and Findings pg 7, #12)

Mr. Tanner and continues with eurd side visitation, free. 274^484
Pg. 2 line 1),
Note:

This stipulation already exists in writing (ree.274-284
pg. 8 #12)
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Mr. Tanner continues, "OTHER ITEMS"-- (rec. 362, Pg. 2 , Hne9).
Mr. Tanner is then cut off mid-sentence by Ms. Marelius.
Ms. Marelius "And I want to add a couple of items". Ms. Marelius
reads into the record "address and telephone number" (ree. 362, , Pg. 2 ,
line 14).
Note:

This is already eovered (ree.285-294 ,deeree of
divorce pg. 4 ,K).

Ms. Marelius reads into the record "petitioner is restrained from
interfering with the child including sehool enrollment, health matters,
child care and other custodial issues and that just comes right out of
the temporary orders"
Note:

These were never discussed and no temporary orders
were ever discussed in the pretrial conference room.
Appellant is unaware of what this is.

Ms. Marelius continues "restraint of derogatory, demeaning,
negative comments"(rec. 362, Pg. 2 , lines 21-22).
Note:

This is already eovered (rec.274-284, facts and
finding pg. 7 #12)

Ms. Marelius continues "we've also discussed telephone contact"
(rec. 362, Pg. 2 , line 23).
Noter

This is already eovered (ree.285-294, deereeof
divorce pg. 3 ,L)

Appellants contention is that the stipulations wbicfr were read
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•

into the record already existed in writing, within the facts and findings
rec.274-284 and the deciee of^divoice jtec.285-294. It makes the
Appellant wonder if it were net just for show.
The court returns to^Mr. Tanner, Mr Tanner is asked^if there i s
anything further Mr. Tanner answers "NO YOUR HONOR". (rec.362,-Pg.
3 lines 16-17).
Mr. Tanners "other items" (ree. 362, Pg. 2 , line 9}. never got^ead
into the record and therefore Ms. Marelius did not include them in the
final draft of the finds and fact and the-decree.
The Judge asks the Appellant" do you under the term* and
conditions of this stipulated settlement? free. 362 Pg. 4 lines 5-8).
Appellant answers "I think I understand them and I'll read through
them when they're written u p and I think everything has been agreed
upon", (rec. #360, Pg. 4 lines 14-16). Appellant says Til read through
them when they're written up". Nothing that we agreed t& in the ^uter
conference room before trial was read into the record. That is why the
Appellant answered "when they are w r i t t e n ^ " .
The Appellant relied on his attorney to get these facts interne
findings and the decree. Those items which he negotiated in-the
pretrial conference room.
Is this a stipulated settlement when there are no stipulations?
The stipulations which was read into the record already existed in-the
proposed facts and finding and the decree. Therefore, how^ean tt4se a
stipulated settlement?
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Appellant told his daughter that she is going to still live with her
mom. But now if she wanted to come home instead of going to-aasa'-s or
other babysitters she could. That if mommy is working or can not be
with you and you want to come home, you can!
When the child told her mother what she understood about being
able to come home, the Appellee called the Appellant. The Appellee said
to the Appellant that this is not the ease.
The Appellant then telephoned Mr. Tanner and left a message for
him to call (July 3rd, 2001), no return call. Appellant again telephoned
Mr. TannerfJuly 5th,2001K no return eaH. Appellant again telephoned
Mr. Tanner (July 6th,20Ol), again no return call. Appellant again
telephoned Mr. Tanner (July 9th, 2001), and again no return call.
Appellant sent fax to Mr. Tanner (July 12th, 2001), and again no
response. Appellant finally received a letter from Mr. Tanner {dated
Aug. 03, 2001, (see attachment #4} & days after the facts and findings
and the decree were already signed by Judge Iwasiki.
Appellant due te- Mr. Tanner's untimeliness in responding to
Appellants calls, lost certain rights, to challenge findings^ and fact ^ n d
the Decree. This untimeliness is a clear violation of responsibilitie& of
the attorney client relationship. It should be noted here that the
stipulations were mailed by Ms. Marelius on July 6th, 2001. Mr. Tanner
mailed a note to Appellant on August 03, 2001 (see Attaehment#4H Mr
Tanner's untimeliness made it impossible for Appellant to challenge 4he
judgments under Rule 50 of U.R.CP.
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Mr. Tanner said he guaranteed {at trial J u n e 29th,2001) that^he
would have in writing that Appellant would have first right of refusat or
first right to tend and for the minor child to come home to Appellant
when the mother could not b e wrtfr her.
Only one of the stipulations which were a^-eed to in the pretrial
conference were made apart of the Facts and Findings a n d Decree. The
one on marital debt. Marital Debts was put back in by Commissioner
Bradfords ruling on Appellants 60 (b) motion and in amending it tea- 60
a motion clerical errors.
If this were correct, that it was an issue of clerical error, would not
the Appellee have made her own 60 (a) motion for this $2000.
And the most important stipulation First Right of Refusal was
negated by Appellee's attorney Ms. Marelius when s h e inserted a
paragraph of her own device, (ree. 285-294, paragraph 2,
subparagraph (a)). Appellant contends this paragraph 2a was inserted
by Appellee's attorney Ms. Marelius after the question arose between
the Appellant and the Appellee over the first right of refusal issue.
After trial J u n e 29th,2001 Mr. Tanner walks Appellant over te^bis
office where Mr. Tanner drafts u p an affidavit for Appellant to sign,
stating that this way h e could get into the record the evidence of
marriage fraud (ree. 236-256).
Mr. Tanner withdrew a& counsel o n October 04, 2001.

HEARING ON MOTIONS DECEMBER 20, 2001
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Appellant hired attorney Steven Kuhnhausen to file a
(U.R.C.P. 60 b) motion to set aside. Appellant discussed the case with
Mr. Kuhnhausen told him of the missing stipulations. Mr. Kuhnhausen
said he could not go for all of the stipulations right now, but would-file
on the First Right of Refusal and the Child Support. Why Mr.
Kuhnhausen would bring ur> all the missing stipulations Appellant does
not know.
Mr. Kuhnhausen said that h e had looked at the file and- that
Appellant was a "bad guy" that Appellant had kept her stuff. Appellant
told Mr. Kuhnhausen that this was not true. Appellant recalled back to
the first time, in front of Judge Iwasik4 January of 1998 when Ms.
Marelius made this statement to Judge Iwasiki.
Mr. Kuhnhausen was given the necessary documents to flte^and
was told that Appellant's mother Katharine Horton {attachment # 5 )
and brother Troy Horton (attachment # 6} whe were alse in the pretrial
conference room and that they would provide written statements as to
what was promised by Mr. Tanner to pretrial conference.
Appellant brought these written statements with himr to-the
hearing on Dee. 20, 2001.
Mr. Kuhnhausen told the Appellant that he could not show them
to the court because Mr. Kuhnhausen did not have them 3 days before
the hearing.
Mr. Ktrhnhauserr was aware of t h i s evidence and air no-time did
Mr. Kuhnhausen inform the Appellant that he needed them before the
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trial. This evidence was so germane to the case that the 60 b motion
was denied. These written statements were the backbone of the case for
the 60b motion to set aside.
In addition under Rule 37 of U.R.C.P. these written statements
could and should have been admitted. Appellants contention is that by
Mr. Kuhnhausen in not offering these written statements to the courts
did not sufficiently represented the Appellant.
Mr. Kuhnhausen made a mistake in not supplying these written
statements to the court.
In transcript (rec.362, pg. 4 lines 14-16) Appellant when asked by
Judge Iwasiki if he understands and agrees responds "I'll read through
them when they are written up and I think everything has been agreed
to". This was said because what was told to Appellant, by Mr. Tanner,
was not mentioned and Appellant was therefore looking to the drafted
facts and findings and decree, "when they are written up". Mr.
Kuhnhausen makes this fact available to the court in (rec. 363 pg.3
lines 24-25).
It was not brought up by Mr. Kuhnhausen in the hearing that Mr.
Tanner at trial in addressing the court as to the pretrial conference that
Mr. Tanner continues with "OTHER ITEMS-" and at this point is cut off
mid sentence by Appellee's attorney Ms.Marelius (rec. 362 , pg.2 line 9).
When the court returns to Mr. Tanner he claims he has nothing more.
The court goes on to questions the Appellant on not having filed a
Rule 59 motion "and he now wants to fix Ibis with a 60 h motion" and
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that "he didn't do all the things to make this right" (hearing on motions
12-20-01, rec. 363 pg.28 lines 6-9). Again, Mr. Tanner did not mail to
the Appellant until Aug 03, 2001 notice that he had received the
paperwork from Ms. Marelius and therefore was unable to meet the 10
day rule, and rule 59 motion. The court recognizes that there is
problems with this and leaves it to the Appellant to file a Malpractice
against Mr. Tanner(rec. 363 hearing on morions 12-20-01, pg.29 fines
19-24) and again suggests that Appellant should have "objected the
first time around"(rec. 363 hearing on motions 12-20-01, pg.29 lines 2023). This is an abuse of discretion on the part of the court
It was however, clear to the courts that there were problems The
court set it aside under a 60 (a) motion. That there was no mention as
to para. 2 (a) in either the proposed facts and finding or the decree of
June 28, 2001. The court thereby ordered that new facts and finding
and conclusions of law and decree be drafted that mirror the tape.
This order thereby completely negates the efforts of parties and
counsel in the, 1 hour long pretrial conference to work out stipulations,
which were recognized by the courts in Judge Iwasiki remarks of
"herculean efforts", (ree. 362 pg.l line 12-13).
It should be noted that again Ms. Marelius made false and
derogatory statements to the court about the Appellant. Ms. Marelius
asserts that the Appellant is "basically homeless" (rec. 363 pg. 16 line
14), that Appellant "lived in his car half of the time" (ree. 363 pg. 17 lines
2-3). Again and again Ms. Marelius makes these untrue statements to
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the court. These and other statements are completely untrue and
displays a lack of candor to t h e eourts by Ms. Marelius and is against
theU.R.J.A. chapter 13, 3.3(a)(1).
Appellant placed full faith and reliance in all of his attorneys Mr.
Macri, Mr Tanner, Mr. Kuhnhausen that there representation could be
relied upon 100%. Appellant spent good money for the guidance and to
protect his interests. Appellant is aware now that mistakes by counsel
were made and in the interest of Justice, Appellant asks to Appeal this
matter before the courts.

3:

Statement of Facts

October 23, 1996 Appellant filed an Complaint for Annulment of
divorce, which included
a.

a temporary and permanent award of custody to Appellant.

b.

child support

November 05,1996 Appellant obtained protective order to against
Appellee.
December 22, 1998 Appellee files affidavit and obtains restraining
order against Appellant. This restraining order was issued based on the
affidavit of Appellee. Attorney for the Mr. Maeri never made Appellant
aware of this document. Appellant now aware of this document
recognizes the absence of truth.
January 12, 1998 Joint custody is ordered by the courts. A
custody evaluation is ordered.
29
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

October 26, 2000 Court grants sole custody of child to Appellee.
In this hearing before Commissioner Bradford attorney for the Appellee
Ms. Marelius makes 1& false statements and swayed the courts to
award custody of the child to the Appellee.
Court also bifurcates the divorce. This is objected to Appellant.
Appellant is seeking an annulment. Ms. Marelius states her client
wants to get remarried! That she can not because there is no
bifurcation or divorce. Court granted bifurcation and reserves for Mai
on issue of annulment (see attachment #2, pg. 15 lines 23-24).
To date, the Appellee has yet to marry Appellee lives with her
boyfriend and Appellants daughter. The eonduet of which is not legal in
the State of Utah. And should have been ruled as such by the custody
evaluator as to moral character.
This proceeding took place without the Appellant having been
served with pleading or motions prior to the hearing and therefore was
without due process, and Appellant did not have the benefit of counsel.
June 29th, 2001, at trial Mr. Tanner was representing Appellant
and Ms. Marelius was representing Appellee.
In the court room before Judge Iwasiki Mr. Tanner addressed the
court and refers to the findings and fact and decree of divoree that they
"will constitute the settlement agreement with the parties with a couple
additions'* (ree.362, June 29, 2001, Pg. 1 lines 21-22).
Mr. Tanner begins with "disparaging remarks" (rec. 362, Pg. 1 line
24).
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.

Note:

This stipulation already covered in (rec. 301-331, Facts
and Findings pg 7, #12)

Mr. Tanner and continues with curd side visitation, (rec. 362,
Pg. 2 line 1),
Note:

This stipulation already exists in writing (rec.301 -331,
findings and finding pg. 8 ,#12)

Mr. Tanner continues, "OTHER ITEMS"- (rec. 362, Pg. 2 , line 9).
Mr. Tanner is then cut off mid-sentence by Ms. Marelius.
Ms. Marelius "And I want to add a couple of items".
Ms. Marelius reads into the record "address and telephone
number contact" (rec. 362, Pg. 2 , line 14).
Note:
|

This is already covered (rec. 301 -331, decree of
divorce pg. 4 , K ).

Ms. Marelius reads into the record "petitioner is restrained from
interfering with the child including school enrollment, health matters,
child care and other custodial issues and that just comes right out of
the temporary orders"
Note:

These were never discussed and no temporary orders
were ever discussed in the pretrial conference room.
Appellant is unaware of what this is.

Ms. Marelius continues "restraint of derogatory, demeaning,
negative comments"(rec. 362, Pg. 2 , lines 21-22).
Note:

This is already covered (ree.301-331, facts and
finding pg. 7 #12)

>
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Ms. Marelius continues "we've also discussed telephone contact"
(rec. 362, Pg. 2 , line 23).
Note:

This is already covered (rec. 301-331, decree of
divorce pg. 3, L )

Appellants contention. The stipulations which were read int&the
record already existed in writing, within the facts and findings and the
decree of divorce. So, where is the stipulated settlement?
The court returns to Mr. Tanner, Mr Tanner is asked if there is
anything further Mr. Tanner answers "NO YOUR HONOR", (rec.362, Pg.
3, lines 16-17).
Mr. Tanners "other items" never get read into the record and
therefore Ms. Marelius did not include them in the final draft of the
finds and fact and decree.
Mr. Tanner did not sign off on the finding and fact or the decree.
Mr. Tanner failed follow through with seeing that the findings and
fact and decree represented that which wa& agreed to in predial
conference.
Mr. Tanner failed to respond many phones calls and a fax sent by
Appellant.
Mr. Tanner failed te-communicate, with the Appellant until a letter
dated August 03, 2001(see attaehment#4). This was 6 days after the
findings and fact and the decree had already been signed by Judge
Iwasiki. Appellant was thereby denied his rights to file a rule 5 0 motion.
HEARINOON MOTIONS DEC. 2€h 2001.
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Appellant files rule 60 b motion. Appellant represented by Mr
Kuhnhausen and Appellee represented by Ms. Marelius.
The court recognized problems with the proceeding of June 29th,
2001 and ordered Appellants 60 h motion t&be amended to a 60 a
motion. Ms. Marelius is ordered to rewrite fee findings and fact andrthe
decree to mirror the the tape of rec. 362.
The court recognized potential malpractice of attorney by Mr.
Tanner and under 60 b motion should ease should have been set aside.
Court ruled against Appellant on failure to take first steps and file
a Rule 59 motion. This option was never available to Appellant due to
the untimeliness of Mr. Tanner's contact with Appellants days after the
facts and findings and decree had already been signed.

SUMMARY O F AJEGUMBNTS

I.

DID COUNSEL FOR THE RESPONDENT OFFER

DEROGATORY AND UNTRUE STATEMENTS TO THE TRIAL COURT
AND THEREFORE MISLEAD THE TRIAL COURTS AND PREJUDICE

THE TRIAL COURTS BASED ON THESE UNTRUES.
A lawyer shall not knowingly make a false statement of material
fact or law to a tribunal. Ms. Marelius has again and again has made
statements to the tribunal that are out and out untruth. It is the
Appellants belief that these untrue statements^ have prejudiced the
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trial court against the Appellant. These acts are a clear violation of
Chapter 13,Rule 3.3 a (1) Ut. Rules of Judicial Review
In October of 2001 after hiring Mr. Kuhnhausen, Mr. Kuhnhausen
after reading Appellants file told the Appellant that "you are a bad guy,
that you kept "Appellee's stuff." This is was not true and if is in the
court record than it is put there by Ms. MareMus.
In a hearing before Judge Iwasiki January 12,199& made a
untrue statements including that the Appellee was not allowed to speak
with her daughter on her birthday, this was also untrue.
Ms. Marelius in a hearing before Commissioner Bradford
(December 26, 2000) made to the trial court 17-18 absolutely false
statements.
»

Ms. Marelius before^Commissioner Bradford (December 20; 2001)
made 2 more absolutely false statements to the trial court, all to
disparage the Appellant, all untrue. All contrary to Rule 3.3 a (4>, Ut.
Rules of Judicial Review
In the interest of taruth and Justice, the findings and fact and the
decree should be set aside.
n.

DID THE TRIAL COURT&ABUSE^ITS DISCRETION IN ITS

REMOVAL OF PETITIONERS JOINT CUSTODY OF A MINOR CHILD,
WITHOUT DUE PROCESSOR LAW AND DID THIS TERMINATION
INFLUENCE LATER CUSTODY PROCEEDINGS.
The Appellant was in court October 26, 2000 without benefit of
34
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counsel and without any pleading as to the proceeding that day. No
procedural due process existed this day for the Appellant. This in itself
is in violation of Rule 5 (1 > of URCP, which provides for procedural: due
process to protect the rights of the parties.
The findings merely recite that Appellee is a fit and proper person
to awarded custody. There were no current findings as to- what would
be in the best interest of the child. The only current facts were false
statements made by the Appellee's attorney. There was a two year old
custody evaluation which the courts deemed insufficient at the time and
ordered a follow-up evaluation. There had been no evidentiary hearing
on the issue of custody to allow the court to hear and weigh evidence
and judge the credibility of witnesses or an ability to confront the
statements made by Ms. Marelius, nor is there a signed stipulation
signed by the parties as to what those facts are. That custody was not
tried by the commissioner upon anymore than hearsay facts presented
by Ms. Marelius on that day that. "A mere finding that the parties are
or are not "fit and proper persons to be awarded the care, custody and
control" of the child cannot pass muster when the custody award is
challenged and an abuse of the trial court's discretion is urgedron
appeal". (Martinez v. Martinez. 728 P.2d 994 (Utah 1986) at page 994.)
Appellant contends that, had custody not changed, that upon the
newly ordered custody evaluation, the evaluator would have after 3
years of joint custody, left custody the same joint custody.
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ffl.

DID THE TRIAL COURT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN

BIFICATING PETITIONERS DIVORCE AND WITHOUT DUE PROCESS
OF LAW?
The Appellant was in court October 26, 2000 without benefit of
counsel and without any pleading a s to the proceeding t h a t day. No
procedural due process existed this day for the Appellant o n G e t 26,
2000, a d e a r violation of Rule-&fl} of URCP.
There was no due process o n t h i s day for the Appellant. And-that
these proceedings should not have manifested any decisions by the
Court.

IV,

DID COUNSEL FOR THE PETITIONER ERR IN HIS

REPRESENTATION OF THE RIGHTS OF THE PETITIONER AND
JUSTICE.
The Appellant arrived a t court o n J u n e 29> 2001 expecting t o g o to
trial. Upon his arrival the one witness he w a s expecting t o have was^the
custody evaluator. It t u r n s out that Mr. Tanner failed tofnvite^the
custody evaluator.
In pretrial conference Mr. Tanner attorney for the AppeHant^eat
down the Appellant into working out stipulations that would at least
give the Appellant more time with h i s child. Mr. Tanner negotiated 1)
'First Right of Refusal', 2} child s u p p o r t would be based onAppeHants
income and a base income of $800 per mo.,3>That Appellant would have
custody of 1 / 3 of the year, 4} that marital debt was to b e dropped 5)
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that back child support for Appellee w a s to be offset by back child
support owed to Appellant.
Mr. Tanner failed to read into the record the agreed stipulations.
Mr. Tanner failed to see that these stipulations were put into the
drafted finding and fact and decree.
Mr. Tanner failed to timely forward on to Appellant the finding and
facts a n d the decree drafted by the Appellee's attorney.

V.

DH> THE TRIAL COURT'S ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN ITS

REFUSAL TO HEAR EVIDENCE TO PROVIDE THE PETITIONER WITH
THE OPTION OF AN ANNULMENT IN HIS MARRIAGE AND THEREBY
ABUSE THE RIGHTS OF THE PETITIONER.
This point of issue r e s t s squarely on Rule 102 of Utah Rule* of
Evidence. Appellant on the issue of seeking a n annulment of-his
marriage was told by Commissioner Bradford, on Oct 26th, 2000, "with
that later on it may be changed to a decree of annulment if you prove
your ease" (see attachment #2, pg. 15 lines 23-24). At t r i a l J u n e 2 6 t h
before Judge Iwasiki Appellant is- told Judge will not allow evidence on
this matter (see attachment # 3 ).
Rule 102 of U.R.E., states, "These rules shall be construed to
secure fairness in administration, elimination of unjustifiable expense
and delay, and promotion of growth and development of the law of
evidence to the end that the t r u t h may be ascertained a n d proceedings
justly determined''.
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Under Rule 502 U.R.E. (4>,(B>. tfii} Petitioner was denied Iris right to
provide evidence.
In a letter to Appellant Mr. Tanner writes "Judge Iwasiki was not
about ta revisit his decision to en lei a divorce decree and made that
clear several times" (see attachment # 3 ).

VI.

DID COUNSBIrMISREPRBSBN^FBTmONERrB^HIg

UNTIMELINESS IN FORWARDING ON THE SUPPLEMENTAL DECREE
OF DIV^^CEiCAUSINGiPJETITIONER.TO LOOSBjCERTABt RIGHTS
UNDER THE LAW?
Utah Code of Judicial Adminisfration Rule 1.4 (a), states a lawyer
shall keep a client reasonable informed about the status of a matter and
promptiy comply with reasonable requests for information.
Mr. Tanner not only did not return phone calls and a fax to the
Appellant between the 3rd of July, 2001 and the 16th of July 2001 but
did not communicate with the Appellant until a letter dated
August 03, 2001 (see attachment #4 ). This was 6 days after the Judge
had already signed off on the findings and fact and the decree. 3 days
in the mail and you are^at the 10 days to file a rule 59 motton^under
U.R.C.P.. This lack of promptness by Appellant's attorney is
misrepresentation and therefore qualifies under 60 (b).
The Appellant should not be held hostage by ineffectiveness^ of
counsel and the 60 (b) motion should have been granted and set aside.
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VH. THE TRIAL COURT'S REFUSAL TO SET ASIDE THE
JUDGMENT ENTERED AGAINST THE PETITIONER WAS CONTRARY
TO CONCEPTS OF JUSTICE AND EQUITY AND AN ABUSE OF
DISCRETION BECAUSE THE PROCESS OF JUSTICE HAD GONE AWRY
BECAUSE OF INCOMPETENCE OF COUNSEL SO THAT MANIFEST
INJUSTICE WAS THE RESULT.
Commissioner held against the Appellant in seeking the 60 (b)
motion hearing of December 20th, 2001 "Appellant didn't do an
objection. He didn't do all of the things you're suppose to do to set it
right. He's asking now to fix it by 60 (b), I am denying the 6 a {b)
motion"(rec. 363, pg. 28, lines 6-9).
Commissioner Bradford "be it malpractice issue or not" (rec. 363,
pg. 29 line 19), therefore doubt existed and again should have been set
aside under attorney neglect or malpractice.
The Appellant had telephoned Mr. Tanner and left a message for
him to call (July 3rd, 2001), no return call. Appellant again telephoned
Mr. Tanner(July 5th,2001), no return call. Appellant again telephoned
Mr. Tanner (July 6th,20Ol), again no return call. Appellant again
telephoned Mr. Tanner (July 9th, 2001), and again no return call.
Appellant sent fax to Mr. Tanner (July 12th, 2001), and again no
response. Appellant finally received a letter from Mr. Tanner (dated
Aug. 03, 2001, see attachment # 4 ) 6 days after the facts and findings
and the decree were signed by Judge Iwasiki.
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Vm. DID THE TRIAL ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN NOT GRANTING
PETITIONER ATTORNEYS FEES?
Statement of the Rule: 4-911, 2 (a),(e). U.R.J .A. The court may
grant the motion if the court finds that: (a), the moving party lacks the
financial resources to pay for costs and fees; (c). the costs and fees are
necessary for the proper prosecution of defense of the action. Under
this rule and the need of the Appellant should have been granted
attorneys fees. The court told Appellee's attorney Ms. Marelius "I'm
going to set you back to exactly what the video says"(rec. 3 6 3 pg 30 lines
3-4).
That without this action Ms. Marelius paragraph 2a would have
stood. It was removed and the motion 60 (b) action was necessary for it
to be removed. The trial court therefore should have awarded attorneys
fees.
ARGUMENT
I.
DID COUNSEL FOR THE RESPONDENT OFFER
DEROGATORY AND UNTRUE STATEMENTS TO THE TRIAL COURT
AND THEREFORE MISLEAD THE TRIAL COURTS AND PREJUDICE
THE TRIAL COURTS BASED ON THESE UNTRUES.
In Rule 4.1 (a), Ut. Rules of Judicial Review, It clearly states that
the making of a false statement of a material fact. Chapter 13,Rule 3.3
a (1) Ut. Rules of Judicial Review, states: A lawyer shall not knowingly
make a false statement of material fact or law to a tribunal a n d Rule 3.3
a (4)
Ms. Marelius h a s again a n d again h a s made statements t h a t are
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out a n d out u n t r u t h s .

The Appellant believes that these untrue

statements have prejudiced the trial court against the Appellant.
In October of 2001 after hiring Mr. Kuhnhausen, Mr. Kuhnhausen
after reading Appellants file told the Appellant that "you are a bad guy,
that you kept "Appellee's stuff." This is was not true and if is in the
court record t h a n it is put there by Ms. Marelius.
In a hearing before Judge Iwasiki J a n u a r y 12,1998 made a
untrue statements including that the Appellee was not allowed to speak
with her daughter on her birthday, this was also untrue.
Ms. Marelius in a hearing before Commissioner Bradford
(December 26, 2000) made to the trial court 17-18 absolutely false
statements.
|

Ms. Marelius before Commissioner Bradford (December 20, 2001)
made 2 more absolutely false statements to the trial court, all to
disparage the Appellant, all untrue. All contrary to Rule 3.3 a (4), Ut.
Rules of Judicial Review
In the interest of truth a n d justice, the findings and fact and the
decree should not be used as a vehicle by which to rewrite history. That
these u n t r u t h s prejudiced the custody evaluator and therefore
produced a n inaccurate evaluation.

H.

DID THE TRIAL COURTS ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN ITS

REMOVAL OF PETITIONERS JOINT CUSTODY OF A MINOR CHILD,
WITHOUT DUE PROCESS OF LAW AND DID THIS TERMINATION
>
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INFLUENCE LATER CUSTODY PROCEEDINGS.
There was no d u e process for the Appellant on this day and that
any action by the court was a n abuse of the Appellants rights.
Rule 5 (1) of URCP provides that papers shall be served upon all ;
parties a n d that without service due process was not proper process.
That h a d custody remained constant and therefore reflected
period of 3 years of joint custody, without problems, the custody would
have been different. And in the absence of the u n t r u t h s made apart of
the record by Appellee, and based on the joint custody guidelines
provided by this state, (Utah code 30-3-10), custody would have been
given to the Appellant.

m.

DID THE TRIAL COURT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN

BIFICATING PETITIONERS DWORCE AND WITHOUT DUE PROCESS
OF LAW?
There was no due process for the Appellant on this day and that
any action by the court was a n abuse of the Appellants rights.
Rule 5 (1} of URCP provides that papers shall be served upon all
parties and that without service due process was not proper process.
According to 75 Am J u r 2d Statute 133, states that a bifurcation of
a divorce in matrimonial cases is not suggested a n d cites Finkel v.
Finkel.120 Misc 2d 936.466 NYS2d 906.

IV.

DID COUNSEL FOR THE PETITIONER ERR IN HIS
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REPRESENTATION OF THE RIGHTS OF THE PETITIONER AND
JUSTICE.
Counsel for the Appellant failed to provide the custody evaluator to
be present at the time of trial.
Counsel for the Appellant failed to read into the record those
stipulation which were negotiated in pretrial conference, thereby
denying Appellant those stipulations.
Counsel for the Appellant failed to return phone calls on half a
dozen occasions.
Counsel for the Appellant failed to attempt to notify Appellant of
the proposed findings and fact and the decree until 6 days after the
findings and fact and the decree had already been signed by the Judge.
|

This untimeliness caused Appellant to lose rights under the law in
regards to the rule 59 motion, a fact which was later held against the
Appellant in the lower court.
In United States v. Tucker. 716 F.2d 576 (9th Cir.1983) paragraph
50, ineffective assistance of counsel: "did counsel act in a reasonably
competent and effective manner and, if not, was his incompetence
prejudicial to the defense".
That the Appellant was prejudiced by his attorney's
representation. That the untimeliness by which the attorney
represented the Appellant, causing the Appellant to lose the right to file
a Rule 59 motion. Appellant was later denied a rule 60 (b) motion based
on this lack of diligence by the lower court.

)
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V.

IS THE TRIAL COURT'S ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN ITS

REFUSAL TO HEAR EVIDENCE TO PROVIDE AN PETITIONER WITH
AN ANNULMENT OF THE MARRIAGE AND ABUSE THE RIGHTS OF
THE PETITIONER.
It was stipulated by the court on October 26, 2000 that addressing
the annulment of the divorce would be reserved for trial.
At trial through Mr. Tanner, Appellant is told that the Judge will
not listen to evidence on the issue of annulment and make a bastard
out of the child. Utah law provides (Utah Code Ann.sec. 30-1-17.2) that
if a n annulment is obtained the child is still considered legitimate in the
eyes of the court.
Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 102 states, "promotion of growth and
development of the law of evidence to the end that the t r u t h may be
ascertained and proceedings justly determined". The federal rules of
evidence Article IV. Rule 402, states: "All relevant evidence is
admissible".
In a hearing before commissioner Bradford October 26, 2001 the
right to seek a n annulment was reserved by the court for trial, (see
attachment #2). At trial Appellant was told by his Attorney that the
Judge will not revisit his decision the divorce (see attachment # 3)
This is a n abuse of the rights of the petitioner by the courts! And,
the judgment should be set aside.
VI.

DID COUNSEL MISREPRESENT PETITIONER IN HIS

UNTIMELINESS IN FORWARDING ON THE SUPPLEMENTAL DECREE
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OF DIVORCE CAUSING PETITIONER TO LOOSE CERTAIN RIGHTS
UNDER THE LAW.
Utah Code of Judicial Administration Rule 1.4 (a), states a lawyer
shall keep a client reasonable informed about the status of a matter and
promptly comply with reasonable requests for information.
Mr. Tanner did not attempt to notify the Appellant until 6 days
after the facts and findings and decree had already been signed.
Thereby, removing the rights of the Appellant to file a rule 59 motion.
This apparent lack of action on the part of the Appellant was held
against the Appellant by the courts in hearing before commissioner
Bradford, where she sites;The court goes on to questions the Appellant
on not having filed a Rule 59 motion "and he now wants to fix this with a
60 b motion" and that "he didn't do all the things to make this right"
(hearing on motions 12-20-01, rec. 363 pg.28 lines 6-9). Again, Mr.
Tanner did not mail to the Appellant until Aug 03, 2001 notice that he
had received the paperwork from Ms. Marelius and therefore was
unable to meet the 10 day rule, and rule 59 motion. The court
recognizes that there is problems with this and leaves it to the Appellant
to file a Malpractice against Mr. Tanner (rec. 363 , pg.29 lines 19-24)
and again suggests that Appellant should have "objected the first time
around"(rec. 363 hearing on motions 12-20-01, pg.29 lines 20-23). This
single failure on the part of Appellants counsel resulted in a prejudice
toward the Appellant by the court and therefore the judgment should be
set aside.
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Vn. THE TRIAL COURT'S REFUSAL TO SET ASIDE THE
JUDGMENT ENTERED AGAINST THE PETITIONER WAS CONTRARY
TO THE CONCEPTS OF JUSTICE AND EQUITY AND AN ABUSE OF
DISCRETION WHERE THE PROCESS OF JUSTICE HAD GONE AWRY
BECAUSE OF INCOMPETENCE OF COUNSEL THAT MANIFEST IN
JUSTICE WILL RESULT OTHERWISE?
Utah law recognizes that "under exigent or exceptional
circumstances which appear to have resulted in a n injustice, the court
may be justified in granting a new trial" because of the negligence of
counsel. Jennings v. Stoker, supra at page 913.
In recognizing this rule, the J e n n i n g s Court cited the earlier case
of Maltby v. Cox Construction Co.. 598 P2nd 36 (Utah 1979). In
concurring opinion which was joined by two other justices, Chief Justice
Crocket stated a s follows:
The purpose of all court proceedings is, of course to do justice. If
the processes have so clearly gone awry that an injustice h a s
resulted, the court in charge of the trial, or the Court on review,
should rectify such an unfortunate occurrence, whether the
proceedings is criminal or civil.
In so saying, I am aware that it is generally said that mistake,
error of judgment or negligence of counsel in presenting or
defending a case is not sufficient cause of vacating a judgment
a n d granting a new trial.
However, consistent with the principle stated above, it is held that,
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under exigent circumstance, incompetence or negligence of
counsel which appears to have resulted in an injustice, will justify the
granting of a new trial, (at page 341, 342)
Ms. Marelius lack of candor to the tribunal.
Mr. Tanner's lack of follow through with respect to: 1) reading into
the record the stipulations negotiated and agreed to by the parties, in
the one hour long pretrial conference, and the 2) lack of response to
repeated attempts of contact by the Appellant, and the 3) untimeliness
in which Mr. Tanner contacted Appellant about the findings and fact
and decree should be sufficient cause to remand for further proceeding
and that the rule 60 b motion should have been granted.
Mr. Kuhnhausen's failure to provide the Appellant to present
evidence supporting his Rule 60 b motion is neglect or a mistake and
should have been presentted by counsel under Rule 37 of U.R.C.P. This
therefore adds to the validity of Appellants claim and justifies the
granting of the judgment to be set aside.

Vm. DID THE TRIAL COURT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN NOT
GRANTING PETITIONER ATTORNEYS FEES?
Statement of the Rule: 4-911,2 (a),(c). U.R.J .A. The court may
grant the motion if the court finds that: (a), the moving party lacks the
financial resources to pay for costs and fees; (c). the costs and fees are
necessary for the proper prosecution of defense of the action.
The rule 60 (b) motion was necessary to have removed the
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paragraph 2 (a) (rec.285-294) which was devised by Ms. Marellus to take
away those rights which were guaranteed to Appellant for visitation.
The court agreed with Appellant and Ms. Marellus was ordered to
redraft the findings and fact and the decree. Attorneys fees should
therefore should have been granted.
QQNCmSIQW

The trial court has apparently abused the rights of the Appellant
on a number of occasions. First, on October 26, 2000 when orders were
made against the Appellant, without the Appellant having had the
benefit counsel or procedural due process. Second, when the trial
apparently denied the Appellant the right to present evidence. Third
when the trial court refused to grant Appellants 60 (b) motion even with
the question of apparent attorney malpractice.
At trial the Appellant was most poorly represented by counsel. Mr.
Tanners failure to read Into the record the agreed upon stipulations, his
total lack of response to Appellants attempts to reach him, and his
gross incompetence with respect to providing the Appellant the finding
and fact and decree days after they were already singed off by the judge.
At hearing on Appellants 60 (b) motion, Mr. Kuhnhausen's failure
to allow Appellant to provide evidence germane to Appellants case.
These results are a shameful Indictment of a system gone awry that the
interests of justice and the best interests of the child have been lost.
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This court should set aside the Facts and Findings and
Conclusions of Law and the Decree Divorce and allow this matter to be
fairly decided, and the Appellant a trial on the merits.
Dated this 0$th day of December 2002.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITXEDJBY
Walter J o h n Horton
Pro-Se

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a true a n d correct copy of the foregoing Brief of the
appellant h a s been sent to Suzanne MareUus the counsel for the
Appellee in this matter, by US mail to the below address:
Littlefield andJ?eterson
c / o Suzanne Marelius
426 South 500 East
Salt Lake City, UT 84102

WalterJ. Horton
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6

^Petitioner's Name

r

y/

% £n i $m fo ^ lib

FUS) DISTRICT COURT
Third Judical District

Address (may be emitted for privacy)
NOV 0 5 1995
City State, ZIP

96.fi LAKE COUNTY
By.

Telephone (may be omitted)

~.K

5 1 , , ^ ,

TOT

FN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

A'Q-tsL&i Mv/?7v^,
PROTECTIVE ORDER
Petitioner,
vs.

civil "NO. f/>

T/ini/?•/</]

KHis'T) 3 /' /f ST7' v'iL i
Respondent.

Judge

This matter came for hearing on fP /^X/ / / y
following parties were in attendance:
\ ^
fV

eli&ttfLQfr—

LlYlUH-Jd

before the undersigned. The
•?.

Petitioner

D

Petitioner's attorney MA-L^Sf

Respondent

o

Respondent's attorney

A

/ ^VX-A^kX

_

,The Court having reviewed Petitioner's Verified Petition for Protective Order and:
having received argument and evidence,

"^Cjuhaving accepted the stipulation of the parties
having entered the default of the Respondent for failure to appear
and it appearing that domestic violence or abuse has occurred,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:
(The Judge or Commissioner shall initial
each section that is included in this Order.)
- • • >

^ -.

m

1.
The Respondent is restrained from attempting, committing, or threatening to
^commit abuse or domestic violence against Petitioner.
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2.
The Respondent is restrained from attempting, committing, or threatening to
commit abuse or domestic violence against the following minor children and members of
Petitioner's family or household:

The Respondent is prohibited from directly or indirectly contacting, harassing,
telephoning, or otherwise communicating with the Petitioner.
4.
The Respondent shall be removed and excluded, and shall stay away, from
Petitioner's residence, and its premises, located at:
and Respondent is prohibited from terminating or interfering with the utility services to the
residence.
5.
The Respondent is ordered to stay away from the school, place of employment,
and/or other places, and their premises, frequented by Petitioner, the minor children and
the designated household and family members. These places are identified by the
following addresses:

6.
The Court having found that Respondent's use or possession of a weapon may pose
a serious threat of harm to Petitioner, the Respondent is prohibited from purchasing, using,
or possessing a firearm and/or the following weapon(s):
7.
The Petitioner is awarded possession of the following residence, automobile and/or
other essential personal effects:

This award is subject to orders concerning the listed property in future domestic
proceedings.
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8,

An officer from the following law enforcement agency:
shall accompany Petitioner to ensure that Petitioner
safely regains possession of the awarded property.
9.
An officer from the same law enforcement agency shall facilitate Respondent's
removal of Respondent's essential personal belongings from the parties' residence. The
law enforcement officer shall contact Petitioner to make these arrangements. Respondent
may not contact the Petitioner or enter the residence to obtain any items.
10.
The Respondent is placed under the supervision of the Department of Corrections
for the purposes of electronic monitoring. Within 24 hours of the execution of this Order,
the Department of Corrections shall place an electronic monitoring device on Respondent
and shall install monitoring equipment on the premises of Petitioner and in the residence
of Respondent. Respondent is ordered to pay to the Department of Corrections the costs
of the electronic monitoring required by this Order. The Department of Corrections shall
have access to Petitioner's residence to install the appropriate monitoring equipment.
RESPONDENT'S VIOLATION OF PROVISIONS "1" TBROUGH "10" MAY BE A CLASS
A MISDEMEANOR.
Petitioner is granted the following temporary relief (provisions "a" through "l") which will
(expire/be reviewed by the court)
days from the date of this order:
7N a.

X

b.

foUowing, minor cchildren:
TheJPetitioner is granted custody of the folio

Visitation shall be as follows:

\Q ^-LAL^lUtJ^y^C.A^
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c.
The Respondent is restrained from using drugs and/or alcohol prior to or during
visitation,
•~fWA

?V d.
The Respondent is restrained from removing the parties' minor child/ren from the
^stateofUtah.

r*^ tX

e.
The Respondent is ordered to pay child support to the Petitioner in the amount of
$ j^iyJUU^j
Ctl 1/W(^3ureuant to the Utah Uniform Child Support Guidelines.
f.
The Respondent is ordered to participate in mandatory income withholding pursuant
to Utah Code Annotated § 62A-11, Parts 4 and 5.
g.
The Respondent is ordered to pay one-half of the minor child/ren1 s day care
expenses.
h.
The Respondent is ordered to pay one-half of the minor child/ren's medical
expenses including premiums, deductibles and co-payments.

_ _ _ i.

The Respondent is ordered to pay Petitioner spousal support in the amount of

$

.

j.
The Respondent is ordered to pay Petitioner's medical expenses, suffered as a result
of the abuse in the amount of $
.
k.
The Respondent is ordered to pay the minor child/ren1 s medical expenses, suffered
as a result of the abuse in the amount of $
_.
1.

Other

Violation of provisions "a" through "1" may subject Respondent to contempt proceedings.
11.
The Division of Child and Family Services is ordered to conduct an investigation
into the allegation of child abuse.
12.

Other:

4
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i"A_j/_ ^
j ^ w enforcement agencies with jurisdiction over the protected locations shall have
authority to compel Respondent's compliance with this Order, including the authority to forcibly
evict and restrain Respondent from the protected areas. Information to assist with identification
of the Respondent is attached to the Appendix to this Order.
Iw

14.
Respondent was afforded both notice and opportunity to be heard in the hearing that
gaveriseto this order. Pursuant to the Violence Against Women Act of 1994, P.L. 103-322, 108
Stat. 1976, 18 U.S.C.A. 2265, this order is valid in all the United States, the District of
Columbia, tribal lands, and United States Territories.

^ ^ _ J ^ 1 . 15. Three years after the date of this order, a hearing may be held to dismiss the
remaining provisions of the order. Within 30 days prior to the end of the three-year period, the
Petitioner should provide the court with a current address, which address will not be made
available to Respondent.

DATED:

'' /) ' ,0A

£^T
BY THE COURT:

DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
Recommended by:

L L U L
District Court Commissioner^

/ i*>u\%
Date

By this signature, Respondent approves the form, and accepts service,
of thisProtective Order arx^aives the right to be personally served.

Respondent
i^ ~

Serve Respondent at:
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TWA—v_43 #
i^v enforcement agencies with jurisdiction over the protected locations shall have
authority to compel Respondent's compliance with this Order, including the authority to forcibly
evict and restrain Respondent from the protected areas. Information to assist with identification
of the Respondent is attached to the Appendix to this Order.
14.
Respondent was afforded both notice and opportunity to be heard in the hearing that
gave rise to this order. Pursuant to the Violence Against Women Act of 1994, P.L. 103-322, 108
Stat. 1976, 18 U.S.C.A. 2265, this order is valid in all the United States, the District of
Columbia, tribal lands, and United States Territories.
~7fvU ^J^L 15. Three years after the date of this order, a hearing may be held to dismiss the
remaining provisions of the order. Within 30 days prior to the end of the three-year period, the
Petitioner should provide the court with a current address, which address will not be made
available to Respondent.
f

DATED:

/)

' (QA

<f&
BY THE COURT:

DISTRICT COURT J U D G ^

3

Recommended by:

District Court C o m m i s s i o n e r ^ D a t e
By this signature, Respondent approves the form, and accepts service,
of thisj^rotective Order anjj^aives the right to be personally served.
^^Cl.if^

Respondent
} ^ ~ ) n Serve Respondent at:

£

-ZLC

OT~

&HIC7.
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Salt Lake County Sheriff's Office
Court Services Division

RETURN OF SERVICE
STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

1)

}

s.s. SHERIFFS OFFICE

\A JfK

/3/WAAJJ^CV

SERVED
D Witness

& Original
D Amended
G Duplicate

D Garnishee (3rd Party

/^^UAJ^a^}^^JU

D Defendant

l(7-7A

ffl Defendant

D Plaintiff

D Plaintiff) * D Other

%

3)

DATE SERVED

U.-Z.-tt'

2)

DATE RECEIVED

4)

PROCESS
D Summons
D Complaint
D Criminal summons
D Amended summons
D Amended complaint
D Verified complaint
D Order to show
D Sup-order
Q Small claims—order & affidavit
D Order
D Garnishment
D Notice D Civil subpoena D Affidavit D Motion D Petition D Notice*of n earfog Q Information D Testimony
D

Garnishee Order

D Decree
5)

•

D Certificate

TYPE OF SERVICE

Criminal Subpoena

D Citation

B Personal

D Exhibits

D Notice of

Seizure

D Declaration

(B Other

y^rf

j)A

\-^^\\

^J^*-^

JL.

D Left at residence with
. at usual place of abode with a person of suitable age and

discretion there residing

Q Posted "(see item 9)

D Company or Corp.
(name & nnej

D Other

6)

L O C A T I O N O F SERVICE

Wilt

HOO^ - ft^- ^jufe^-Xj) .

D Other

O Home

D Business

(Specify, jail, hospital, etc.)

7)

(B l further certify that at the time of service, o n c o p y served. I e n d o r s e d the date, s i g n e d my n a m e a n d official title thereto.

8)

D l tendered a fee of $

9)

D Mailed a copy of notice, postage prepaid, to said defendant o n (date)

. & took receipt which is hereto attached.
;

at given address, (see item 6). by clerk

AARON D. KENNARD, Sheriff of Salt Lake County, State of Utah
DOCKET # Jt) ^ IMbb^y
r»oX*ce^*- J „v,

A Z ^

>SHERIFFS FEES:
Service

I certify that the forgoing is true and correct and that this certificate
isexecuted on

(date) J

rHM>

By

UAftM*

$

'Mileage
$
Total
$

,/ *

A
2?
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
Case No. 964904582 - DA

WALTER JOHN HORTON,

Appellate Case No. 20020275-CA

Petitioner,

TAMRIKA KHVTISIASHVILI,
Respondent.
MOTION OCTOBER 26, 2000
BEFORE
COMMISSIONER SUSAN BRADFORD

WJ

J\f

U

CAROLYN ERICKSON, CSR
CERTIFIED COURT TRANSCRIBER
1775 East Ellen Way
Sandy, Utah 84092
801-523-1186

PY
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APPEARANCES
For the Petitioner:

PROSE

For the Respondent:

SUZANNE MARELIUS
ATTORNEY AT LAW
* * *
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SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH - OCTOBER 26, 2000
COMMISSIONER SUSAN BRADFORD PRESIDING
P R O C E E D I N G S
THE COURT:

Tamrika K. matter, and my apologies,

ma'am, I would slaughter your name and it would be embarrassing
for me and you would probably be insulted so I won't go there.
Go ahead, counsel.
MR. HORTON:

I have a question before the Court if I

may get an understanding of that before she continues?
THE COURT:
MR. HORTON:
THE COURT:
MR. HORTON:
THE COURT:

What's the question, sir?
The law in motion,
Well, what does that mean?
Is that what we're doing here today?
What this is is parties may file for

temporary relief while the case is pending and the law and
motion is where people make motions and then there's a decision
made on that while you're getting your case brought to trial
and so this is sort of an interim step while you're waiting for
your case to be completed.

I hope that suffices.

It's sort of

an abbreviated —
MR. HORTON:

- motions are something new since our

last meeting within your chambers?
THE COURT:
law.

No. Most of this has always been in the

It's just something that they brought today.
MS. MARELIUS:

I know Mr. Horton's problem is he
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1

probably hasn't received a copy of my motion because the

2

mailing address he gave the Court and me, is apparently not a

3

good address and so I got one pleading back at least.

4

I've sent him three things.

5

such address, so I'm still a little uncertain as to that

6

mailing address.

7

Court today.

8

an attorney spoke with me and said Mr. Horton, you know, talked

9

to me about this OSC and when it was but now apparently he's

I think

I got one thing back that said no

So he may be confused about what's before the

I know that he has consulted with counsel because

10

not retained that attorney.

11

notice but I think it's his duty to keep the Court informed and

12

I would ask again that Mr. Horton give us a valid mailing

13

address.

14
15

THE COURT:

So, I was a little concerned about

That is correct. And before we go on, Mr,

Horton, for the record, what is your address?

16

MR. HORTON:

17

THE COURT:

It is 450 East Slade Place, 84102.
And it is your affirmative duty, sir, if

18

you change addresses, phone numbers, you must let the Court

19

know and counsel know that you have done that.

20

MR. HORTON:

21

THE COURT:

22

25

It is presumed that that's a good

address.

23
24

I understand.

MR. HORTON:

My bills arrive there.

there.
THE COURT:

Go ahead, counsel.
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I receive mail

MS. MARELIUS:

I'm glad to have that.

Your Honor, we

were before you September 11 in this case for a Pretrial. Mr.
Horton was present by himself at that time and the Court
entered some orders, gave him 10 days to file a Financial
Declaration, which he has not done; five days to return
journals to my client, which he didn't do; three weeks to
return property to the grandmother, which he didn't do; and
ordered the parties to.cooperate with an updated custody eval.
I was hoping after that, those admonishments, those
deadlines by the Court, we may have an attorney on board or
some effort to settle this and none of that happened.

In fact,

Mr. Horton went to California for 30 days so he just left and
we've continue to have problems in this case.
The other piece of new information is I contacted the
custody evaluator for an update. Apparently DCFS has one parttime social worker doing these.
this.

He had eight cases ahead of

He said, if you're lucky, I'll start March, April,

Spring and based on that I just could not imagine my client
going that long or these parties without a temporary order in
place.

We've never had that.

We had a protective order that

long expired and a visitation order, so given the level of_
problems we're having, we just must have a temporary order.
I also ask this Court to certify it for trial. I
think you probably did.

You suggested an update but I jut

think it's intolerable for these folks to wait that long and I

3
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1

would like to just go ahead to Judge Iwasaki at this point, I

2

mean, after this.

3

know, along those lines, but I think we have enough to complete

4

the case.

5

He may send up back to the updated, you

'**ff

So with that background, what we are requesting today

6

is that petitioner - I'm sorry - respondent be awarded sole

7

custody of this five and a half year old child.

8

it is, we had one and half year old marriage and a four year

9

separation.

Astonishing as

This case has been pending all that time.

They've

10

had a three day/four day exchange visitation order which worked

11

pretty well most of the time for a child under five, not in

12

school. As time has gone on, the child has been more and more

13

with my client as Mr. Horton has been more and more in

14

California and I would submit that there's no question that she

15

is primary caretakerA\)That was certainly the finding of the

16 J custody evaluator that was dated April, x98 and these events of
17 I more time with my client have been certainly subsequent to
18 J that.

19

It's also very telling, parties have been under a

20

Court order for four years.

What do they do in those four

21

years?

22

employment.

23

earnings, income.

24

maintaining a 3.8 average.

25

categories of having a goal in life and working towards it.

My client has maintained a stable residence,%
She's had a couple jobs.

She's always had

She's been at the University of Utah
She's just doing very well in the
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She's also entered into a new relationship and is now living
with her fiancee'.

She would love to get married.

She can't

because we don't have a bifurcation or a divorce here.
So, in those four years, my client I think has
accomplished a lot.

She's also been the sole financial support

of this child.'l) She has done all of the caretaking,^fall of the
health appointments,^ all of the arrangements for that£7 She's
enrolled the child in schoolv- As soon as that happened, we
started to have a higher degree of interference.

Mr. Horton

thought she should skip kindergarten, be in first grade, tried
to withdraw her a couple of times. My client finally convinced
the school not to do that3 He's since changed her schedule at
kindergarten, making her stay another hour without consulting
my client and we don't think that's appropriate.
The big problem now by contrast is Mr. Horton - and
I'm not even sure he's going to be arguing for custody today,
but he has done nothing in four years.

He had no job and no

home four years ago. "He still has no job and no home.l^I
consider him homeless \\ During the visits he seems to take the
child in his car and drive between restaurants and coffee
shops.

When he has overnights, it's always at a home of a

relative.v Most recently it's been at his brother's home and
that could change.

He has a father in the area too and so he

does not have a home for the child and the child has no room or
particular attachment to these relatives which is a very big

5
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

1

contrast to my client.1 He's never provided any support, never

2

shown us that he can do that. \7

3

V^

His profession is apparently one of an inventor and a

4

remodeler.

5

home he was remodeling that my client had real concerns about.

6

It was a construction site with nails and equipment all around

7

and she was very uncomfortable with the child visiting there.

8

And at this point, I don't think Mr. Horton has met any basic

9

standard of being a presentable custodial parent.

10

His longest point of residing someplace was in a

So we seek

sole custody.

11

I also believe we need to have a standard right of

12

visitation here.

This year we've had ten months this year. I

13

think it's fair to say he spent half the year in California and

14

so I think the visitation order should be no more than standard.

15

but my client would also accommodate his availability and she's

16

shown a very great willingness to do that with this three and

17

four days thing.

18

conflicts and contempt so I think we can trust in her to do

19

that if there is a long absence.

We've not been to Court a thousand times on

20

Visitation I think has to be very limited here. I

21

mean, not limited but defined so it is at a location that my

22

client knows.

23

at a home or location other than that, I think she needs to

24

know.

25

advance because we've had, you know, as I've indicated

The brother's home is fine.

If it's going to be

If it's going to overnight, she should check it out in
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historical concerns on the kind of dwelling he thinks is
appropriate.
Child support has never been paid.

I would like to

file with the Court a copy of a worksheet based on my client.
She filed a Financial Declaration.

She earns $1,416 a month.

I am assessing minimum wage for Mr. Horton to support amount of
$141 and I think it's important that we begin that process of
support order and see what happens.
I think the standard provisions, they have shared
child care costs.
ordered.

It's not been a problem but that should be

Sharing of out of pocket health insurance premiums

and payments should be ordered.

Restraint from petitioner

interfering with school enrollment and the relationship between
the child and mother must be ordered.
disturbing episodes.

We've had some very

The child is telling the mother "Daddy

tells me he hates you but I love you, mom." And this shouldn't
be happening.

She's clearly having some emotional control here

by the father and that really is terrible. \ I
We also have Mr. Horton dropping in unannounced.*^7 The
child, you know, he suggests the child calls him and says bring
over my book or something.

We need to have it very clearly

understood that visitation is on the standard schedule or other
times previously agreed, that he's not to just stop by the
home.
Number 7, maintain addresses and telephone numbers.
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I think we've made that request clear.

Restraint from

derogatory comments in the presence of the childrequested bifurcation,
trial.

We've

I, you know, or to just move ahead to

Both of those would be great.
And then Number 10, we've sought costs and fees in

this matter.

We're happy to reserve that for trial. We really

are a little in the dark on the income issues as there's been
no Financial Declaration.
And then last, we would request contempt for the
refusal to return the journals and the grandmother's property
and I think since you did also include the Financial
Declaration be ordered within 10 days of September 11, that's
not been done, I would reiterate that we need that ASAP.

But I

think for that contempt we should be awarded sanctions and

^

attorney's fees for that.
If I might approach and hand you the support
worksheet.
THE COURT:

And counsel, for your review, it came to

us, I believe it was this morning, it is a Financial
Declaration affidavit of Mr. Horton.

It's a very quick one

page affidavit and in it he has a Financial Declaration.

It

looks like his monthly income is $1,183.58 if I'm reading it
correctly.
MS. MARELIUS:
THE COURT:

Okay.

But he has provided that.
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I'll let you

look at this now and then we'll make a copy for you.
MS. MARELIUS:

Thank you, and I can just - maybe I'll

take this back and (inaudible).
THE COURT:
MR. HORTON:

Okay.

Thank you.

Mr. Horton, your comments, sir.

Well, it's a little difficult to

memorize all that Tamrika's attorney has gone over.

I'd like

to take them line by line.
THE COURT:

Sir, I'm going to urge you as I urged

everyone at the top of the hour, I have four minutes until the
2:00 calendar starts and there's still another case to go.
That means I'm going to have you go through this quickly.

I

have read what you've submitted, just tell me briefly if you
have disagreements with what they've stated.
MR. HORTON:
THE COURT:
MR. HORTON:
bothers me the most.

If you do —

Absolutely.
- hit those points.
Let's take the contempt charge.

It

I was at Tamrika's home at the specified

time, the specified date, she was not there.

I left a note on

the doorstep, said I leave tonight for California to finish my
job, we'll have to take care of it.
anything.

She never mentioned

I put in my affidavit to the Court that I would

bring those to Court today.
THE COURT:
MR. HORTON:

Do you have them with you?
Of course, so that everything can be

taken care of before Your Honor so that no longer can I be

9
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accused of —
THE COURT:

Do you have the videos?

Do you also have*

the videos, sir?
MR. HORTON:
THE COURT:

Yes, I do.
So you have journals, diaries and the

photocopies of —
MR. HORTON:

Personal properties which belong to

Tamrika and I do have, I also have a receipt for property which
I've altered.

I'd like her to initial that it agrees that

she's received things back.

I changed the dates of course

because she was not available on the other day.
It is true that I did work in California a good part
of this summer.

(inaudible) however, was with me for at least

60 days of that time.

Not being around, with Tamrika's having

broken her leg, I've been doing all of the shuttling back and
forth from Dagny to day care to Tamrika, to picking Tamrika up
from her work or a class and taking her to her home, delivering
Dagny at a time when it's convenient for Tamrika because of
other obligations and no one else to take care of her.

Of

course, if there is ever a time when Tamrika cannot take care
of her, I've always said that I am there to do so.

The only

exception is when I happen to be out of town working this past
summer which is not an unusual thing.
like that necessarily for work.

I don't go out of town

It has happened but this was a

job for my sister and she was going through a difficult time
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and her husband had passed away.
THE COURT:

I don't need to hear about it-

I just

need you to stay very close to the facts.
MR. HORTON:

Okay.

As far as custody, as far as

getting a separation done, I'd like at this time to submit
photocopies supporting the reason per the request for an
annulment for the marriage.

And I have a few things here which

if you read over, starting with the first one where she names
me by name as being a good candidate to marry, for getting into
the country.
THE COURT:

Okay.

Mr. Horton, on these issues, have

you shown first of all these documents to counsel?

Do you have

a copy for her today?
MR. HORTON: No.
THE COURT: And the issue of an annulment is not
before me today.

That issue is something that will be

determined at trial.
MR. HORTON:

My attorney passed away, excuse me for

interrupting, but my attorney passed away.
THE COURT:
MR. HORTON:

I know.
These copies were all that's in the file

that I received from him.

I assumed that they had gone to

opposing counsel at that time.

I've been trying to get this

thing happening since 1996 and for two years while Dagny was in
my sole custody, Tamrika was going back and forth with an
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1

attorney, Mr. Allred, hiring him, firing him, hiring him and it

2

put it off for years which you can read from the docket —

3
4

THE COURT:

Tell me about custody.

Do you challenge

her having sole custody?

5

MR. HORTON:

Yes, I do, Your Honor, and I seek to

6

have this married annulled.

I have an appointment with, not an

7

appointment, but in two weeks I'll be meeting with immigration

8

and her status is questionable.

9

status and therefore, I don't believe that custody should be

She does not have a valid

10

awarded to someone who may be subject to deportation at their

11

decision.

12

this time and here illegally and subject to deportation.

According to one officer, she's out of status at

13

THE COURT:

14

MR. HORTON:

Okay.

So that would be hearsay.

She's not high on the priority list,

15

however. So I still have custody to the best of my knowledge.

16

She gave up custody three years ago when I first started this

17

thing.

18

found out recently, but we have had this shared visitation.

19

is really difficult, emotional abuse toward my daughter from

20

her mom.

21
22
23
24
25 J

I understand that only was valid for six months, I

I can quote something last night.
THE COURT:

It

She —

Sir, that would be hearsay.

I don't want

to hear that.
MR. HORTON:

Well, so is opposing counsel's statement

on the same issue.
THE COURT:

I want you to stay to the point.

I'm
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getting what you're saying.
MR. HORTON:

Okay.

Because of Tamrika's illegal

status, possible illegal status, according to immigration law,
she should not have custody of my child, our daughter, and
therefore, I don't agree that the Court should give it up.
I've always been there for my daughter.

I had sole custody for

two years while Tamrika was doing whatever else with her life
and it wasn't until January of x98 when I was shot down when
Judge Iwasaki was first assigned to this case and I first saw
him.
THE COURT:

Sir, let me ask you a question.

Where

you live presently, is it a place that you are remodeling?
MR. HORTON:
live with my brother.
THE COURT:

No, I am not.

When Dagny is with me, I

He has a home up in Olympus.
Okay. And so that's where you would go

when you have the child?
MR. HORTON:
THE COURT:
MR. HORTON:
of the time.

Yes, uh-huh (affirmative).
Okay.
And his children are there as well part

He has only - so she has a good atmosphere.

THE COURT:

I've heard enough unless you have

anything more, Mr. Horton?
MR. HORTON:
THE COURT:

No, I suppose not.
Okay.

Thank you, sir.

Counsel, I'm prepared to make a recommendation unless
13
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1

you have something further and I will let you review this and

2

we can make a copy of this for the Court.

3

Before the Court today is respondent's motion.

4

is seeking full custody.

5

going on what seems a lifetime.

6

longer than your entire marriage.

7

has to be greatly frustrating to everyone here.

8

the case, and I'm quite certain that Judge Iwasaki would

9

request and want an update on the custody evaluation;

She

I'll note that this case has been
You've now been separated
It continues to go on.

It

So that being

10

therefore, since that looks like it is at least six to seven

11

months off, minimum, and that's to start it, I'm going to

12

address the custody issue and note that Judge Iwasaki very

13

clearly left the issue of temporary custody up to the

14

Commissioner and stated that earlier when he made his ruling on

15

January 23, '98. That being the case, the child is now five

16

and a half.

17

between the two is not in the best interest of this child.

18

simply is not.

19

consistent.

20

this point and I think I heard both of you agree to the same

21

point there.

She is school age. A three day/four day swap
It

That is not - stability building is not

It is disruptive to a child that is school age at

22

MR. HORTON:

Your Honor -

23

THE COURT:

Sir, sit down.

24

my recommendation.

25

entertain them, but not now.

At this point I am giving

If you have comments afterwards, I will

14
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#

1

For the child's best interest, the stability favors

2

the mother.

She's in one place.

She is financially stable.

3

The father is self-employed, has moved around, has been in

4

California this year, has had more than one residence on

5

several occasions.

6

she is granted the temporary sole custody of the minor child.

7

The father will have the statutory visitation.

8

the child when he has the child overnight to the brother's home

9

which he stated is where he is enjoined, seeing the child when

Stability favors the mother so therefore

He is to take

10

he has her.

Child support shall be set according to the

11

mother's income of $1,416 a month and the father's, I believe

12

I've given you that copy, if memory serves me, it was $1,183,

13

but if you will prepare a worksheet as to those numbers. Per

14

statute you will divide any day case costs equally, the same as

15

to medical insurance and uninsured.

16

The issue of bifurcation, knowing that Judge Iwasaki

17

will be adamant about a custody update, I see that there is no

18

good reason not to bifurcate this.

19 I .20

— - M R . HORTON:
THE COURT:

What is the word?
It's a bifurcated divorce, sir, and what

21

that means is I'm going to grant that a decree of divorce be

22

entered in this case and I know you're asking for an annulment

23

and with that condition that later on it may be changed to a

24

decree of annulment if you prove your case, sir. At this point

25

in time, you may proceed and prepare the paperwork for a
15
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1

bifurcated decree of divorce.

2

reserved to trial and specifically health insurance.

3

not to change the coverage or effect one another's coverage

4

effectuated through this bifurcation.

5

specifically a death benefit is not to be changed because of

6

this bifurcation and lastly, the valuation of the marital

7

estate is reserved until —

8

MR. HORTON:

9

THE COURT:

10

All issues in this case will be
You are

Retirement issues,

The what?
The valuation of the marital estate is

reserved, sir.

11

MR. HORTON:

12

THE COURT:

What does that mean?
That means that anything that you have

13

property wise is reserved until the time of trial. Otherwise,

14

it would be for today and that doesn't make sense to me.

15

want it reserved until trial and that doesn't prejudice either

16

of you.

17

Moving on.

You

There will be no attorney's fees for

18

today.

The issue of contempt I believe has been resolved. Mr,

19

Horton has brought with him the journals, diaries, and tapes

20

and I believe you can take those matters out in the hall,

21

exchange them, and sign off on the various paperwork but it

22

looks like it's been provided.

23

that were asked for.

I believe those are the issues

24

Have I missed anything, Counsel?

25

MS. MARELIUS:

We did want a restraint, Your Honor
16
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from interference with the school and in the relationship
between the parent and the child, restraint of derogatory
comments, keep informed of address and phone.
THE COURT:

And all of those things are appropriate

and it should be a mutual restraining order on derogatory
comments.
child.

Neither of you should make comments like that to a

You should both keep one another appraised and the

Court of your address and phone numbers and certainly there
should be no interference with the child at school and other
relationships that she has with both of you.
Thank you very much.
MS. MARELIUS:
THE COURT:

I'll prepare an order.

Thank you.

Thank you.

(Whereupon the hearing was concluded)

(C)
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CERTIFICATE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that the foregoing transcript
the before mentioned hearing held before Commissioner
Susan Bradford was transcribed by me from an audio tape
and is a full, true and correct transcription of the
requested portion of the proceedings as set forth in the
preceding pages to the best of my ability.
Signed this 26th day of August, 2002 in Sandy,
Utah.

Carolyn Ei^ickson
Certified Shorthand Reporter
Certified Court Transcriber
My Commission expires May 4, 2006
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MARTINS. TANNER
Admitted to Practice Law in

TELEPHONE:

ARIZONA

ATTORNEY AT LAW

CALIFORNIA

(801)575-7100

340 BROADWAY CENTER
FACSIMILE:

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

111 EAST BROADWAY
(801)575-7150

UTAH

SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84111-5250

October 4,2001
Walter Horton
3357 Bernada Drive
Salt Lake City, UT 84124
Cell: (801)558-1276
Work: (801) 428-1777
Dear Walter:
Enclosed, please find, as you requested, a copy of your file. You will also find a copy of my
withdrawal as your counsel in this matter. I am withdrawing, immediately for several reasons. First,
you do not seem to like my advice. You have told me that you wanted to fight for an annulment,
despite the fact that a divorce decree was entered in this case before I was ever contacted by you.
Judge Iwasaki was not about to revisit his decision to enter a divorce decree and made that clear
several times. Had we tried, he indicated in chambers to me and Suzanne Marelius at the pretrial
conference that he would likely award costs and fees to your former wife. Second, you seem to want
to revisit the stipulation agreed upon in open court. This cannot be done. Third, although I have told
you that if your former wife is not acting as ordered in the supplemental decree of divorce, especially
with respect to the advisory guidelines in connection with visitation, you have not taken my advice
to schedule a hearing and take her back to court. Fourth, you are behind in your financial
obligations.
Walter, I sympathize with your situation. You obviously care a great deal about your
daughter and I hope you can have more time with her in the future. I wish you all the best in your
future endeavors.
Very truly yours,

MST/as
C:\l\Domcstic\HonotiWalicrxWuIierHorton Leiicr2.upd
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MARTINS. TANNER
TELEPHONE:

Admitted to Practice Law in
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(801)575-7100

340 BROADWAY CENTER

CALIFORNIA

FACSIMILE:
111 EAST BROADWAY

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

(801)575-7150

SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84111-5250

UTAH

August 3, 2001
Walter Horton
3357 Bernada Drive
Salt Lake City, UT 84124
Cell: (801)558-1276
Work: (801) 428-1777
Dear Walter:
Our offices have received in the mail a copy of the proposed Supplemental Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law and Decree of Divorce from Suzanne Marelius. They appear to me to be
consistent with the stipulation we reached in court to settle your case. If you would like to personally
review them, please contact me so that you can come in and review them. I will hold them until I
hear from you. We have ten days from the date of this letter to object if you believe they are not
consistent with our agreement.
Very truly yours,

MST/as
C:\l\Doniesiic\HononWalter\WalterHorton.LeiterI
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To: Walter J. Horton

December 20,2001

I
I

These are my recollections of your discussion and events with your attorney Martin Tanner in the pre-trial room on
June 29,2001. Also present was D. Troy Horton, my other son,

j
^-

Walter was expecting to go to trial for physical custody of his daughter, Dagny Alexandria. Horton. He was also asking
for an annulment of his marriage to Tamriko Khvtjsiashvili.

:?
^
li

Walters representing attorney Mr. Taimar was insistent that Walter give up en fee annulment portion because "this
Judge won't make a bastard of Dagny,"

Walter bad understood that the custody cvaluator would be in court. He had not been subpoenaed. The custody
' cvaluator had seen a school drawing by Dagny showing hcr-self wanting to live with her Dad.

5

The final assurance in regard to custody was that Walter would have Dagny anytime Tamriko was not able to be with
her, "In other words, Dagny would be with Walter rather than being left with, grandma, Mom's boyfriend or an outside
caretaker" when Tamriko works late or is unable to be with Dagny. "The father has preference over other care givers."

y

Walter feeling comfortable that Dagny would have more consistency in her life with the above arrangement of care,
agreed to Dagny being with either her mother or himself. Attorney Tanner also stated that with standardized visitation
Walter would have Dagny 1/3 of the time.

There was a discussion as to the legal term for the disillusion of marriage with Mr. Tanner stating it would be
"irreconcilable differences" and Walter feeling fraud or adultery should be indicated. Walter, recognizing he was losing
each of his concerns without being heard on any of his areas of facts was reluctant to accept "divorce." The attorney
"J stated that if he goes to trail it would be $5-6,000 in court costs and attorney fees. The attorney was not willing to
'
present any of the facts Walter had of evidence because the "Judge was not interested/' He stated he would get
r
Walter's documents filed with the proceeding's documents so they would be apart of the court records. This was
reluctantly acceptable to Walter.

£f

Finally child support was addressed. Child support was to be based on Walter's income of $800 per month. Child
support would be for the maintenance of Dagny, her child care and health insurance. Back child support was brought
up with Walter asking about the two years that he was the provider and received no financial support.

i

In the court room Attorney Tanner began by saying an agreement had been readied without verbally spelling out what
was agreed upon. At no time in the court proceedings were the areas of agreement from the pre-trial room verbalized.

Walter is an excellent parent His concern is for Dagny's well being and her ability to grow to a well adjusted healthy
j s\ adult. He has not kept Dagny from Tamriko or her grandmother as evidenced by the period when he was the sole
caretaker from the time she was one to three years old. He felt it was important for Dagny to know her Mom so he took
Dagny to Tamriko and grandma.

i/

Walter's attorney was insistent that Walter would not get custody of Dagny, saying there was no reason for the Judge to
change custody. Walter felt he should never have lost custody in die first place and wanted to be heard in this area.
Attorney Tanner was in and out of the pre-trial room which made it difficult to maintain a flow of discussion. There
was a tremendous sense that the Judge was annoyed by the length of time it was taking to come to agreement and
further delays would only make him angrier. This time consuming process would make the Judge find against Walter
and any of Walter's fa^s would not be receivedjavorably.
Submitted by:
KathalTifte L, Horton
916/780-5441
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12-19-01
Re:

June 29th 2001 Client Conference

To Whom It May Concern:
I, Troy Horton, was present on June 29th, 2001 in a conference between Walter Horton
and Martin Tanner (attorney) on the details of the decree of divorce, as well as with my
mother Katharine L. Horton.

7

It was clearly promised in that conference that the decree would be written up with the
stipulation that Walter would be the first right of refusal to care for Dagny in the event
that her mother was unavailable. It was made very clear that Walters fear was that once
the divorce was final that if it was not in writing that the mother would take away that
right and place Dagny in the care of Dagny's grandmother on her mothers side. Mr.
Tanner assured Walter he would read the stipulations to the Judge to ensure that
happened.

•^

I know the issues and concerns of Walter, which were many (i.e. the above, reason for the
divorce being annulment not irreconcilable differences-divorce, child support, phone
contact, school involvement etc), and with each one that was brought up the attorney
chided Walter and told him that the Judge was not going to rule in his favor on some of
those issues stating, "that the court was not going to make a bastard out of the child and
therefore an annulment was not going to be permitted, and that if he didn't agree to the
decree as it currently stood with a few minor modifications that he would likely loose the
chance to get the simple things as well." It was clear to me that Mr. Tanner was trying to
pressure Walter into just folding and giving in. I spoke up at that point and told Mr.
Tanner that I didn't personally think the Judge cared if it took 30 minutes or 2 hours to
negotiate and work out the details. This decree is a forever document and if it is going to
take a few extra minutes to get it right then so be it. All parties need to have the patience
to do what is right and fair. Mr. Tanner then addressed the issues Walter wanted and
wrote them down on his note pad to discuss with Tamrika's attorney as stipulations to be
entered in the decree.

v

Not all of the stipulations Walter requested were even read to the Judge and before long it
was over and in the hallway Walter was in tears wondering what just happened, feeling
he'd been railroaded into the divorce leaving him without custody when clearly in my
mind he should have never lost it in the firstplace.
Sincen

D. Troy Horton
jQANNER
2091Br§ntUnt
^attLakt City, Utah 84121
MyCommlwtonExpkw
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Rule 1.4. Communication.
' (a) A lawyer shall keep a client reasonably informed about the
• status of a matter and promptly comply with reasonable requests
for information.
Rule 3.3. Candor toward the tribunal.
(a) A lawyer shall not knowingly:
(1) Make a false statement of material fact or law to a tribunal;
Rule 3.3. Candor toward the tribunal.
(a) A lawyer shall not knowingly:
(4) Offer evidence that the lawyer knows to be false. If a lawyer
has offered material evidence and comes to know of its falsity,
the lawyer shall take reasonable remedial measures.
Rule 4.1. Truthfulness in statements to others.
• In the course of representing a client a lawyer shall not
».Knowingly:
(a) Make a false statement of material fact or law to a third
person; or
(b) Fail to disclose a material fact to a third person when
disclosure is necessary to avoid assisting a criminal or
fraudulent act by a client, unless disclosure is prohibited by
Rule 1.6.
Rule 4-911. Motion and order for payment of costs and fees.
(2) The court may grant the motion if the court finds that:
(A) the moving party lacks the financial resources to pay the
costs and fees;
(C) the costs and fees are necessary for the proper prosecution
or defense of the action; and

Pi
* JTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE
ARTICLE I. GENERAL PROVISIONS
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Rule 5. Service a n d filing of pleadings a n d o t h e r papers.
'(a) Service: When required.
(1) Except as otherwise provided in these rules or as otherwise
directed by the court, every judgment, every order required by its terms to be
served, every pleading subsequent to the original complaint, every paper relating to
discovery, every written motion other than one which may be heard ex parte, and
every written notice, appearance, demand, offer of judgment, and similar paper
shall be served upon each of the parties.
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
Rule 37. Failure to make or cooperate in discovery; sanctions.
(fj Failure to disclose. If a party falls to disclose a witness, document or other
material as required by Rule 26(a) or Rule 26(e)(1), or to amend a prior response to
discovery as required by Rule 26(e)(2), that party shall not be permitted to use the
witness, document or other material at any hearing unless the failure to disclose is
harmless or the party shows good cause for the failure to disclose. In addition to or
in lieu of this sanction, the court may order any other sanction, including payment
of reasonable costs and attorney fees, any order permitted under
' subpart (b)(2)(A), (B) or (C) and informing the jury of the failure to disclose.
PART I. JUDICIAL COUNCIL RULES OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION
CHAPTER 13. Rules of PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT.
Rule 1.1. Competence.
A lawyer shall provide competent representation to a client.
Competent representation requires the legal knowledge, skill,
thoroughness, and preparation reasonably necessary for the
representation.
Rule 1.2. Scope of representation.
(a) A lawyer shall abide by a client's decisions concerning the
objectives of representation, subject to paragraphs (b), (c), (d),
and shall consult with the client as to the means by which they
are to be pursued. A lawyer shall abide by a client's decision
whether to accept an offer of settlement of a matter. In a
criminal case, a lawyer shall abide by the client's decision,
p after consultation with the lawyer, as to a plea to be entered,
whether to waive jury trial and whether the client will testify.
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^These rules shall be construed to secure fairness in
"administration, elimination of unjustifiable expense and delay,
and promotion of growth and development of the law of evidence to
the end that the truth may be ascertained and proceedings justly
determined.
Rule 502* Husband-wife.
(4) Exceptions. No privilege exists under subparagraph (b) of this
rule;
(B) Furtherance of crime or tort. As to any communication which
was made, in whole or in part, to enable or aid anyone
(ill) to conceal a crime or a tort;
Federal Rules of Evidence
Article!
Rule 102. Purpose a n d Construction
* These rules shall be construed to secure fairness in
administration, elimination of unjustifiable expense and delay, and
promotion of growth and development of the law of evidence to the end that the
truth may be ascertained and proceedings justly determined.
75 American Jurisprudence 2d
Section 133:
At first blush, a materimonial action would appearr to be most susceptible to
bifurcation. In most such actions, a point is reached where there is no real dispute
over ending the marriage itself, Most divorce actions could be settled if it were not
for the task of resolving the ancillary issues such as custody......
Accordingly, while bifurcation is an attractive procedural device in many tort
proceedings, such is not the case in matrimonial distutes.
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